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Abstract
This dissertation concerns methods for improving the reliability and quality of
explanations for decisions based on Neural Networks (NNs). NNs are increasingly
part of state-of-the-art solutions for a broad range of fields, including biomedical,
logistics, user-recommendation engines, defense, and self-driving vehicles. While
NNs form the backbone of these solutions, they are often viewed as “black box”
solutions, meaning the only output offered is a final decision, with no insight into
how or why that particular decision was made. For high-stakes fields, such as
biomedical, where lives are at risk, it is often more important to be able to explain
a decision such that the underlying assumptions might be verified.
Prior methods of explaining NN decisions from images have been proposed, and
fall into one of two categories: post-hoc analyses and attention networks. Post-hoc
analyses, such as Grad-CAM, look at gradient information within the network to
identify which regions of an image had the greatest effect on the final decision.
Attention networks consist of structural changes to the network, which produce
a mask through which the image is filtered before subsequent processing. The
result is a heatmap highlighting regions which have the greatest effect on the final
decision. This dissertation identifies two flaws with these approaches. First, these
methods of explanation change wildly when the network is exposed to adversarial
examples. When an imperceptible change to the input results in a significant
change in the explanation, how reliable is the explanation? Second, these methods
all produce a heatmap, which arguably does not have the definition required to
truly understand which features are important. An algorithm that can draw a
circle around a cat does not necessarily know that it is looking at a cat; it only
recognizes the existence of a salient object.
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To address these flaws, this dissertation explores Sensory Relevance Models
(SRMs), methods of explanation which utilize the full richness of the sensory do-
main. Initially motivated by a study of sparsity, several incarnations of SRMs
were evaluated for their ability to resist adversarial examples and provide a more
informative explanation than a heatmap.
The first SRM formulation resulted from a study of network bisections, where
NNs were split into a pre-processing step (the SRM) and a classifying step. The
result of the pre-processing step would be made very sparse before being passed to
the classifier. Visualizing the sparse, intermediate computation would potentially
have yielded a heatmap-like explanation, with the potential for more textured ex-
planations being formed off of the myriad features comprising each spatial location
of the SRM’s output. Two methods of achieving network bisection using auxiliary
losses were devised, and both were successful in generating a sparse, intermediate
representation which could be interpreted by a human observer. However, even a
network bisection SRM which used only 26 % of the input image did not result in
decreased adversarial attack magnitude. Without solving the adversarial attack
issue, any explanation based on the network bisection SRM would be as fragile as
previously proposed methods.
That led to the theory of Adversarial Explanations (AE). Rather than trying
to produce an explanation in spite of adversarial examples, it made sense to work
with them. For images, adversarial examples result in full-color, high-definition
output. If they could be leveraged for explanations, they would solve both of
the flaws identified with previous explanation techniques. Through new mathe-
matical techniques, such as a stochastic Lipschitz constraint, and designing new
mechanisms for NNs, such as the Half-Huber Rectified Linear Unit, AE were very
ii
successful. On ILSVRC 2012, a dataset of 1,281,167 images of size 224× 224 com-
prising 1,000 different classes, the techniques for AE resulted in NNs 2.4× more
resistant to adversarial attacks than the previous state-of-the-art, while retain-
ing the same accuracy on clean data and using a smaller network. Explanations
generated using AE possessed very discernible features, with a more obvious in-
terpretation when compared to heatmap-based explanations. As AE works with
the non-linearities of NNs rather than against them, the explanations are relevant
for a much larger neighborhood of inputs. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that
the new adversarial examples produced by AE could be annotated and fed back
into the training process, yielding further improved adversarial resistance through
a Human-In-The-Loop pipeline.
Altogether, this dissertation demonstrates significant advancements in the field
of machine learning, particularly for explaining the decisions of NNs. At the time
of publication, AE is an unparalleled technique, producing more reliable, higher-
quality explanations for image classification decisions than were previously avail-
able. The modifications presented also demonstrate ways in which adversarial
attacks might be mitigated, improving the security of NNs. It is my hope that this
work provides a basis for future work in the realms of both adversarial resistance
and explainable NNs, making algorithms more reliable for industry fields where
accountability matters, such as biomedical or autonomous vehicles.
iii
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Glossary
Adversarial Attack / Adversarial Example: When a neural network is trained,
it generates the correct output for some set of inputs. An adversarial attack is a
modified version of an input for which the network would have been correct, but
for the modified version, the network produces incorrect output. The perturba-
tion from the clean input to the adversarial input is typically imperceptible for
state-of-the-art networks. Since the perturbation is difficult for a human observer
to detect, it may be used as an attack which makes the network fail in a way a
human observer would not. More information may be found in Chapter 1.
AE: Adversarial Explanation. The most prominent contribution of this work, an
adversarial explanation is an explanation which demonstrates features salient to the
network’s classification in the same domain as the network input, and is produced
via the same method as adversarial attacks. AEs are described in Chapter 4.
ARA: Accuracy-Robustness Area. On a graph with axes of allowable adversarial
perturbation RMSE and classifier accuracy, the ARA is the area between a clas-
sifier’s curve and the curve for a naive classifier. Since a non-naive classifier will
always be susceptible to adversarial attacks of some magnitude, the ARA measures
the decline in a classifier’s performance as progressively larger attacks are allowed.
See Section 4.1.1 for additional information.
Attack ARA: ARA applied specifically to accuracy; that is, the “accuracy” axis
used for the RMSE classification should be based on a top-1 classification accuracy.
xix
See Section 4.1.1 for more information.
BTR: Better Than Random. For two classes which are closely related, the at-
tack ARA is an unreliable measurement since the two classes are likely to gain
confidence in tandem. BTR is therefore used to measure the difference between a
class’ confidence and a random confidence value, as opposed to attack ARA, which
measures the difference between the top two classes. See Section 4.2.1.2 for more
information.
BTR ARA: The ARA metric computed with the accuracy axis replaced by the
percentage of inputs where the correct class has greater than random confidence.
See Section 4.2.1.2 for more information.
Explanation: In the context of this work, an explanation is a means of under-
standing the decision made by an NN, ideally in a reliable way which requires
minimal training to interpret. See Chapter 1 and Section 4.1.2 for comparisons
amongst different state-of-the-art NN explanation methods.
GIM: Gradient Integration Module. A method for achieving a network bisection
SRM by tracking gradient statistics in a secondary network. See Section 3.3.2 for
more information.
HHReLU: Half-Huber Rectified Linear Unit. The methods outlined in Chapter 4
optimize the first derivative of the network’s output. A traditional ReLU function
has a continuous value and a discontinuous first derivative, making optimization
difficult. This may be eased by using a one-sided Huber function, which has both
a continuous value and first derivative. See Section 4.2.4 for more information.
xx
HITL: Human-In-The-Loop. Most supervised NNs are trained using inputs which
have been annotated by human annotators. To improve the NN’s training, the data
for more inputs must be gathered and these new inputs must then be labeled. HITL
methods in this work refer to methods of improving a network’s training without
requiring new data, instead leveraging communication between algorithms using
the NN (such as AE) and a human observer. See Section 4.2.8 for more information.
LCA: Locally Competitive Algorithm. A sparse coding algorithm which minimizes
the number of non-zero coefficients while simultaneously maximizing the fidelity
of an input reconstruction based on the resulting sparse code. See Section 2.1 for
more information.
ML: Machine Learning. Computer algorithms which learn without explicit pro-
gramming. Rather than describing the input to output transformation explicitly,
that transformation is learned based on examples of the desired function.
Network Bisection SRM: An SRM realized by bisecting an NN, and inserting
an auxiliary loss at that point to enforce sparsity. Additional requirements and
information is laid out in Chapter 3.
NN: Neural Network. An ML algorithm which combines layers of artificial “neu-
rons,” which weight input signals, with non-linear activation functions. The result
is a highly-parametrized model which can replicate a wide variety of functions.
ReLU: Rectified Linear Unit. An NN activation function which truncates negative
values to zero, and leaves positive values unchanged.
xxi
RMSE: Root-Mean-Squared Error. A measurement of difference between two
vectors, which is calculated by taking the square root of the mean of the squared
difference between the elements in the vectors. Equal to the Euclidean distance
between the two vectors normalized by the square root of the number of elements
in the vectors.
SGD: Stochastic Gradient Descent. A method for training NNs which involves the
repeated estimation of the network’s gradient with respect to some loss function,
and then moving weights away from that gradient in an attempt to minimize the
value of the loss function.
SRM: Sensory Relevance Model. A method of explaining an NN’s output which
utilizes the same domain as the network’s inputs. By using the exact same format
as the original input, a human observer may leverage their prior experience with
the problem domain to analyze the NN’s decision in its original context, using
changes between the explanation and the original input to infer relevance. This is
in contrast to approaches which super-impose metadata on a sensory image, which
may often be misinterpreted due to unclear relationships between the metadata
and the original sensory domain. Two classes of SRM were explored: the network
bisection SRM in Chapter 3, and adversarial explanations in Chapter 4.
xxii
1
Introduction
Deep learning is a fast-advancing technique for dealing with multidimensional in-
put signals, including images and videos. The top performers for challenges such
as ImageNet have been dominated by deep learning solutions [22], and the broad
applicability of the technique has garnered usage across a swath of fields, including
biomedical [24], logistics [40], user-recommendation engines [13], and defense [1].
Part of this popularity is owed to the genericism and simplistic efficiency of the
approach: input signals are passed to highly-parallelizable computational layers
that transform the data multiple times before producing output signals. The set
of transformations possible in a sufficiently deep and wide network is infinite due
to the repeated, non-linear activation functions. For this reason, deep Neural Net-
works (NN) have been more effective on complicated problems than straightfor-
ward Bayes’ approaches or other traditional Machine-Learning (ML) techniques.
These output signals are in practice iteratively adjusted to minimize an arbitrary
objective function via the popular backpropagation algorithm. This approach is
extremely flexible: either the network’s output may be adjusted to approach some
target signal, or the network’s output may optimize some task-specific heuristic.
To date, NN-based approaches have all been “black box” approaches, which im-
pose no requirement for conveying intuition on the internals of the network. Many
different internal architectures exist based on intuitive or beneficial properties, such
as convolution or pooling layers, but the final interactions of these components are
unrestricted and impossible to intuit. Furthermore, these networks tend to get
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stuck in local minima that exist on the training set but not on test examples from
the larger problem. This condition is known as over-fitting, and it can limit the
ability of existing neural networks to achieve good performance on cases outside of
the training set. An example of this phenomenon can be seen when training a net-
work to classify a photo as containing an animal or not. Without efforts to prevent
it, many instances of the network will learn to classify a blurry background as an
animal, and a crisp background as not an animal, an artifact of the focal length for
different types of photography [34]. For human operators, this “black box” quality
makes debugging the systems - or improving them - a virtually impossible task.
Overall, the goal of this dissertation was to find a more reliable and informative
way to explain the decisions made by neural networks. Here, “explain” means a
method which demonstrates the reasoning behind a network’s output to a person,
in such a manner that does not require the person to have expert training to
interpret the explanation. A method of explanation should also have high fidelity
to the model: that is, it should be unambiguous how the input would need to
change to get a different result.
Current methods for debugging NNs are unreliable. The state-of-the-art for
post-hoc network analysis involves investigating the internal layers via saliency
maps [21, 59], or looking at the receptive fields to which internal nodes respond
[4, 39, 47, 54, 58, 75]. Methods of modifying an NN’s architecture such that an
“attention map” is both generated and used to filter inputs have also been pro-
posed [12,25,28,64]. In addition to generating compelling explanations, attention
methods have been shown to improve network accuracy. However, as this disser-
tation establishes, all of these existing methods share the same two flaws when
considering their value for explaining network behavior.
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Figure 1.1: Reproduction of Figure 3 from [28]. They proposed a very compelling, multi-level
attention scheme which highlights salient objects wonderfully on the CIFAR-10 dataset. Fur-
thermore, their scheme shows how the network’s attention is distributed at multiple levels within
the network. Nonetheless, these highlights beg the question: within the regions marked salient,
what qualities actually affect the network’s output?
The first flaw is demonstrated in this dissertation via adversarial attacks (also
known as adversarial examples). Adversarial attacks are extremely small perturba-
tions which completely change the network’s output; they are termed an “attack”
because they may be used maliciously, for instance to make a turtle appear as a
rifle [2]. Adversarial attacks against networks compatible with existing explana-
tion methods have little to no correlation with the explanations generated by those
methods. If an explanation were reliable, then the perturbations which change the
network’s output should be related to that explanation. This is not the case for
existing methods, drawing into question the importance of the regions highlighted
by these explanation methods (Section 4.1.2).
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The second flaw concerns the limited merit of heatmaps. Attention methods,
such as Jetley et al.’s [28], produce extremely compelling masks of salient objects
in the input (Fig. 1.1). However, while these do arguably show the region which
most affected the network’s output (ignoring the first flaw of adversarial examples
for the moment), they do not address the qualities of those regions that affect
the output. In the third row of Fig. 1.1, for instance, who is to say that the
network’s output was “deer” and not “dog?” Both classes would have roughly the
same salient outline. From a human point of view, it would be easy to justify the
explanation algorithm as including the antlers, but the algorithm itself highlighted
a large region, the antlers being only a small portion of the overall explanation.
Thus, the extent of the explanation’s benefit is to show that the salient object was
considered, nothing about how or why it was considered. Existing explanation
methods all focus on the generation of a heatmap, and all heatmap-based methods
share this flaw (Section 3.4).
This dissertation proposes Sensory Relevance Models (SRMs) as a means of ad-
dressing the previously mentioned flaws, while also bringing deep learning closer to
a form that can be reliably understood and manipulated by human operators. SRM
refers to methods of explanation which utilize the same domain as the network’s
sensory inputs. By using the exact same format as the original input, a human
observer may leverage their prior experience with the problem domain to analyze
the NN’s decision in its original context, using changes between the explanation
and the original input to infer relevance.
For the first formulation of SRMs, network bisection, only the first of the above
flaws were known. Adversarial examples affected any known method of explaining
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an NN’s decision, even attention networks. From the very existence of impercep-
tible adversarial examples, it may be inferred that NNs rely on very high gain
factors from the input. Existing explanation methods were either post-hoc or
attention-based, which multiplied all inputs by a small, but non-zero, coefficient.
Attention-based examples were deemed a promising direction, and it was reasoned
that filtering out spatial elements at different levels absolutely - multiplying by
zero - would eliminate some of the input elements needed for adversarial attacks
and focus the remaining attack into coherent features.
Counter-intuitively, explorations of the original SRM proposal resulted in ad-
versarial examples with equivalent or even smaller perturbations. While investi-
gating their spatial statistics yielded interesting salient regions at different levels
in the network (Section 3.3.2), they utterly failed at the original goal of producing
a reliable explanation mechanism. It seemed necessary to solve the mystery of
why adversarial examples were not improved by this first iteration of SRMs, which
utilized fewer input elements. Merely by the zeroing of some portion of inputs
(up to 74 % on CIFAR-10), one might expect that the result would be adversarial
examples of a larger magnitude. This was not the case. While investigating this
phenomena, I also came to realize the second of the above flaws: heatmap-based
methods do not possess the necessary richness to explain failure cases.
The failure of that first SRM led to a much more informative success: ad-
versarial explanations (Chapter 4). The realization of the second flaw with ex-
isting explanation methods necessitated a new method which would not rely on
a heatmap. The original flaw necessitated an approach that worked alongside
adversarial examples, or resulted in adversarial examples that aligned with the ex-
planation. Consider the nature of a minimum-perturbation adversarial example:
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Figure 1.2: State-of-the-art methods of explaining an NN’s decision based on some input (a) rely
on the generation of some heatmap (b), generated here via Grad-CAM [58]. In cases where the
object’s shape is non-discriminatory, this provides little insight into the decision. Adversarial
examples produce much richer output, and can be leveraged to accentuate the NN’s decision (c),
making salient features clearly visible when compared with the original image. Alternatively,
some desired output may be encouraged to demonstrate features salient to that desired output
(d). This technique also demonstrates training deficiencies - clearly, the COCO dataset contains
few images of burgers from a top-down perspective, and a pile of ingredients is a strong indicator
of sandwich-ness. Unless otherwise specified, all images in this paper were taken by the authors
to avoid copyright issues.
it demonstrates the nearest decision boundary. That is, if adversarial examples
themselves could consist of more significant perturbations, they would function as
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definitive explanations. Adversarial examples have the capacity to illustrate the
closest boundary, similarly to how other machine learning methods, such as trees,
can be inspected for the closest boundary. To the best of my knowledge, this has
not been proposed nor realized previously. The resulting work proposes a variety
of techniques for enhancing the adversarial robustness of an NN. The work also
demonstrates the efficacy of these techniques, not only surpassing the previous
state-of-the-art defense against adversarial attacks by 2.4×, but also producing
rich, full-color explanations that clearly illustrate the features considered salient
by the network. The principle is demonstrated in Fig. 1.2. Compared to a state-
of-the-art heatmap method, Grad-CAM [58], the adversarial explanations much
more clearly demonstrate salient features and the reasoning behind the decision,
and rely less on the human observer’s intuition to fill in missing information. This
work was packaged into the attached paper, Appendix A.1.
Two new SRM techniques were proposed and analyzed in this dissertation.
Network bisection is a novel form of attention which completely obscures parts
of the input and is learned through an auxiliary loss, not directly through the
classification loss. Adversarial Explanations (AE) are a novel group of techniques
for stabilizing an NN such that adversarial attacks against that network are larger
in magnitude and consist of coherent features.
The network bisection SRM formulation offered no benefits over other state-
of-the-art work in its family. Newer techniques, such as the aforementioned Li
et al. [35] or Jetley et al. [28] works on attention, have more pronounced benefits in
terms of accuracy and HITL interaction when compared to the network bisection
SRM. This dissertation also attempted a combination of the network bisection
SRM formulation and the AE work. The results of the AE work were not enhanced
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by the old SRM formulation, and were superior in every quantifiable and qualitative
capacity.
The new AE techniques for robust networks and reliable explanations are un-
paralleled at this time. They accomplish the same goals as the originally proposed
SRM: increased adversarial resistance and a capacity for HITL interactions, as
detailed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, they surpass the original expectations of this
dissertation, as a fundamentally new way of investigating the operation of NNs.
In contrast with previously proposed heatmap-based methods, including the net-
work bisection SRM, the AE techniques provide higher-definition and more reliable
feedback. As an added bonus, they demonstrate that classification networks may
be used for generation, a machine learning niche previously occupied predomi-
nantly by Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) and Variational Autoencoders
(VAEs).
1.1 Contributions
This work contains evidence of my work since the completion of my master’s degree
in February 2016 [70], including:
1.1.1 Primary Contributions
• Proposed network bisection SRMs, a form of saliency maps that are inte-
grated into the network (Chapter 3).
• Implemented network bisection SRMs via activity adjustment (Section 3.3.1)
and gradient integration modules (Section 3.3.2). Demonstrated that SRMs
can produce effective saliency maps which reveal key regions of the input
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and work in a hierarchy, but that these shed little light on the final decision
(Section 3.3).
• Established that network bisection SRMs do not increase resistance to ad-
versarial attacks, due to increased variance in remaining pixels (Section 3.4).
• Created NN modifications and training strategies aimed at producing high-
quality adversarial explanations, which improve on the state-of-the-art re-
sistance to adversarial examples by 2.4×, and conducted a comprehensive
ablation study of each modification (Chapter 4, [72], under peer review with
Nature Machine Learning as in Appendix A.1).
• Improved adversarial training without other improvements by 17 %, in terms
of both ability to resist adversarial attacks and produce explanations, via the
L2,min adversary (Paragraph 4.3.1.15.2 and Appendix A.1, [72]).
• Showed that adversarial examples could be used to produce reliable expla-
nations with salient features (Chapter 4, [72]).
• Introduced the Better Than Random (BTR) Accuracy-Robustness Area (ARA)
quantitative metric, which correlated well with the quality of explanations
produced (Section 4.2.1.2, [72]).
• Utilized adversarial examples as part of a Human-in-the-Loop workflow for
enhancing network robustness against adversarial attacks (Chapter 4, [72]).
• Produced a report for Oregon Health & Science University (OHSU)’s MEP-
LINCS data on the effects of different ligand treatments on cell cultures
in-vitro, based on the adversarial explanation methodology (Section 4.5).
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1.1.2 Auxiliary Contributions
• Extended my M.S. thesis work, the Simple Spiking Locally Competitive Al-
gorithm (SSLCA) [70], to include inhibition and an analysis of its efficacy
when combined with modern deep learning techniques (Chapter 2; included
as Appendix A.2, [69]).
• Proposed and evaluated four different architectures for performing vector
matrix multiplication, a vital function for NNs, using memristors [68].
• Extended the training method for Rozell et al.’s Locally Competitive Algo-
rithm (LCA) to combine supervised and unsupervised information, giving it
better task-oriented effectiveness while still focusing on preserving the infor-
mation contained in its inputs (Section 2.3).
• Partnered with UCLA to identify spoken digits, using an AgI atomic switch
network as a computational reservoir (submitted). They made and tested
the device, I formulated the experiments and analyzed the resulting data for
computational ability.
• Applied the LCA to radiation detection as part of the Defense Threat Re-
duction Agency (DTRA) program.
• Implemented a state-of-the-art deep learning classification pipeline, applied
to many different problems include CIFAR-10, the Stanford Tower dataset,
and OpenAI’s Gym’s CarRacing environment.
• Published 8 peer-reviewed papers, including:
– W. Woods and C. Teuscher, “Fast and Accurate Sparse Coding of Visual
Stimuli with a Simple, Ultra-Low-Energy Spiking Architecture,” IEEE
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Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems, pp. 1-15, 2018
[69] (Appendix A.2).
– W. Woods et al., “Approximate Vector Matrix Multiplication Imple-
mentations for Neuromorphic Applications using Memristive Crossbars,”
IEEE NANOARCH, 2017 [68] (winner of the conference’s Best Paper
award).
– K. Scharnhorst et al., “Non-Temporal Logic Performance of an Atomic
Switch Network,” IEEE NANOARCH, 2017 [57].
– M. Taha et al., “Approximate in-memory Hamming distance calculation
with a memristive associative memory,” IEEE NANOARCH, 2016 [62].
– W. Woods, “The Design of a Simple, Spiking Sparse Coding Algorithm
for Memristive Hardware,” Portland State University Master’s Thesis,
2016 [70].
– W. Woods et al., “Synaptic Weight States in a Locally Competitive Al-
gorithm for Neuromorphic Memristive Hardware,” IEEE Transactions
on Nanotechnology, 2015 [71].
– W. Woods et al., “Memristor panic - A survey of different device models
in crossbar architectures,” IEEE NANOARCH, 2015 [73].
– W. Woods et al., “On the Influence of Synaptic Weight States in a Lo-
cally Competitive Algorithm for Memristive Hardware,” IEEE NANOARCH,
2014 (winner of the conference’s Best Student Paper award) [67].
• Published 6 non-peer-reviewed proceedings, including:
– W. Woods, J. H. Chen, and C. Teuscher, “Reliable Explanations via
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Adversarial Examples on Robust Networks,” Portland State University
Student Research Symposium, 2019.
– U. Khan, W. Woods, and C. Teuscher, “Exploring and Expanding the
One-Pixel Attack,” Undergraduate Research & Mentoring Program, no.
34, 2019.
– J. H. Chen, W. Woods, and C. Teuscher, “Explanation Methods for
Neural Networks,” Portland State University Student Research Sympo-
sium, 2019.
– W. Woods, J. H. Chen, and C. Teuscher, “Explaining the Conclusions
of Neural Networks,” Early Detection Conference at Oregon Health and
Sciences University, 2018.
– J. H. Chen and W. Woods, “Generating Adversarial Attacks for Sparse
Neural Networks,” Undergraduate Research & Mentoring Program, no.
31, 2018.
– J. Meng, C. Teuscher, and W. Woods, “Radiation Source Localization
by using Backpropagation Neural Network,” Portland State University
Student Research Symposium, 2018.
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Locally Competitive Algorithm
The foundation of the SRM began via extensions to Rozell et al.’s LCA [55].
Sparsity was seen as an important factor for a useful explanation, consistent with
insight into human explanations [45]. As a concept, the SRM never relied on the
LCA, but the intrinsic sparsity properties of the LCA lent it as an excellent starting
point for discussing the bisection of networks to produce intermediate output with
semantic significance.
2.1 LCA
Our work on Rozell et al.’s LCA has led to a deep understanding of sparsity in
ML [68,69,71]. Briefly, the LCA is a solution to the sparse coding problem: given
an M ×N dictionary Φ consisting of N examples of an input space of dimension
M , how might an arbitrary input s(t) be best represented as a linear combination
of the columns of Φ? That is, an estimate of the input, ŝ(t), can be built via
some coefficients a(t) as ŝ(t) = Φa(t). Solving the sparse coding problem involves
devising some algorithm q(·) that maps a(t) = q(s(t)). The sparse coding problem
encapsulates the trade-offs between minimizing the number of non-zero coefficients
in a(t) and the fidelity of ŝ(t) compared to the actual input s(t). Formally, the
sparse coding problem may be posed as minimizing the following energy equation:
E(t) =
1
2
||s(t)− ŝ(t)||2 +
∑
m
λC(am(t)), (2.1)
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where λC(·) is a penalty term that, when large, emphasizes a small number of ac-
tive coefficients, and when small, emphasizes fidelity in the reconstruction. Equa-
tion (2.1) is minimized by the LCA [55].
The minimized energy equation, Eq. (2.1), demonstrates that sparse coding has
a tuning knob, λ, which can be used to trade between higher coefficient sparsity or
greater fidelity to the input. It has been theorized that sparse coding is an integral
part of biological computation processes, due largely to the evidence of sparse
coding activity in the mammalian cortex [42, 76]. As a result, many hardware
implementations of the LCA have sprung up [7, 29, 30, 48, 50, 52, 53], including my
own [69].
2.2 LCA and Deep Learning
Part of my attached paper on an LCA hardware implementation (Appendix A.2,
[69]) involved comparing the accuracy of deep learning models trained both on raw
data and on LCA-encoded data. Despite biological backing for sparsity, the LCA
always reduced the accuracy of the deep learning model. While the LCA solves
the sparse coding problem, it relies on a dictionary that is trained on example
inputs using unsupervised training. This unsupervised training typically derives
from Oja’s rule [46], which updates elements participating in the reconstruction
such that subsequent reconstructions will be more accurate:
Φt+1 = Φt + µ(s(t)− ŝ(t))aT . (2.2)
While the LCA solves the sparse coding problem, it traditionally relies on a
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dictionary trained via this method, potentially discarding information which would
be helpful for classification in favor of information which decreases the L2 distance
between the original input and the reconstruction.
Regardless of lost accuracy, the potential benefits of the LCA became clear
through this work. The LCA identifies prominent features in its input, and greatly
reduces the non-zero dimensionality of its output. One issue with investigating NNs
is that, in a typical convolutional layer, far too many elements in the convolution
are non-zero to visualize what the network is considering. With an LCA, the
number of non-zero elements is so low that they can be visualized. We discuss
adapting the LCA as the base of the SRM, while simultaneously addressing the
loss in accuracy, in Section 2.3.
2.3 Supervised LCA
The LCA traditionally uses unsupervised learning. As its operation is defined en-
tirely through reconstructing its input, unsupervised learning is a natural fit. How-
ever, unsupervised operation has its trade-offs. While unsupervised approaches
tend to learn quickly, they never perform as well as task-specific (supervised)
approaches. Rather than making all of their parameters available for the final
objective, they are instead attempting to solve a completely different task: re-
representing their input. On the other hand, supervised approaches attempt to
transform their input for a single purpose, with each transformation bringing the
data in the network closer to the desired output. Supervised learning is required
to solve the overall information processing problem. This is where SRMs come
in as a middle ground: we implemented a system that cleans up the input in a
task-specific manner, while also preserving and compressing qualities of the input
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to make the results more sensible to manipulate.
To consider using an LCA with backpropagation, we must be able to define the
output of the network in terms of its inputs. This is due to the derivatives required
for backpropagation to function. However, the LCA’s operation is traditionally
defined in reverse, where the input may be reconstructed as a linear combination
of dictionary elements. Manipulating this expression using the Gramian leads to:
s(t) ≈ Φ(t)a(t),[
ΦT (t)Φ(t)
]−1
ΦT (t)s(t) ≈ a(t). (2.3)
Taking the true derivative of Eq. (2.3) with respect to each weight in Φ(t) would
be cumbersome and expensive due to the inverse, which may either be unstable or
not exist if all dictionary elements are not sufficiently independent of each other.
Instead, we replace the Gramian with its diagonal approximate, propagating the
scalar derivative of each element in turn:
[
ΦT (t)Φ(t)
]−1
ΦT (t)s(t) ≈ a(t),
||Φi(t)||−22 ΦTi (t)s(t) ≈ ai(t),
−
∑
j 2Φj,i(t)∂Φj,i(t)
||Φi(t)||42
ΦTi (t)s(t) + ||Φi(t)||−22 ∂ΦTi (t)s(t) ≈ ∂ai(t), (2.4)
To show the efficacy of this approach, we have compared the traditional, un-
supervised method of training the LCA with this novel, supervised method of
training an LCA. Each network compared consisted of a single LCA layer with a
16
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Samples Trained (thousands)
0
20
40
60
80
A
cc
u
ra
cy
(%
)
Unsupervised LCA
Supervised LCA
Supervised + Unsupervised LCA
Figure 2.1: Supervised extension to the LCA vs its original, unsupervised formulation.
dictionary represented by 50 neurons followed by a single perceptron layer with
10 neurons for classification on the MNIST digit database. Results are shown
in Fig. 2.1. Note that the traditional, unsupervised approach quickly reaches its
maximum performance, and then hovers at that level or even loses some ability to
classify the input due to its emphasis on reconstructing the input well rather than
classifying the input well.
On its own, the supervised gradient is incapable of training the LCA. A purely
supervised approach breaks down due to the conflict between the supervised loss we
derived above and the sparse coding equation intrinsically minimized by the LCA
(Eq. (2.1)). The incompatibility of these two terms causes the columns of Φ to
become degenerate, leading to a collapse of the network’s functionality. However,
combining the supervised gradient with the unsupervised gradient results in a more
stable and higher-accuracy network configuration. This indicates that the LCA,
which reconstructs an input stimulus based on a limited number of prominent
features, can be adjusted to reconstruct the input stimulus based on task-specific
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features. The two loss functions together eliminate the reduced accuracy of using
a sparse coding layer while retaining its sparsity properties.
2.4 Extending the Supervised LCA to SRMs via Network Bisection
The supervised version of the LCA was functionally a bisected network with two
parts: one responsible for generating a task-oriented sparse code of the input, and
another for converting the resulting code into a decision regarding the input. This
was the underlying theory of SRMs as originally proposed: suppress irrelevant
aspects of the input, forwarding only those that would affect the prescribed task.
Furthermore, since we derived a task-oriented gradient, we could use that gradient
to manipulate the LCA independently of the overall network. This was the key
implementation idea behind manipulating the SRM: it is feasible to descend both
the loss function for the overall task as well as an auxiliary loss function applied
only to the intermediate output from the network, which might be defined by a
human operator. In this way, the sparse output of the SRM, which might be
implemented via an LCA on top of other processing layers, could both be used to
investigate the operation of the network at an intermediate step and to guide its
processing.
The first proposed method for achieving an SRM therefore involved a poten-
tially iterative procedure for bisecting the network into two pieces: one which
generated a sparse, intermediate representation, and the second which generated
a classification based off of that intermediate representation. While the first for-
mulation for realizing SRMs had many similarities to attention-based neural net-
works [12,28,64], it was unique for two reasons: first, the mask was learned through
backpropagation via an auxiliary loss separate from the classification loss; second,
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the mask generated by the proposed SRM would exist in a transformed feature
space congruent with the input space but potentially scaled or richer in features.
This would allow for a much sparser output than typically seen with attention-
based neural networks. In the context of adversarial examples, zeroing much of
the input would render high gain on those masked regions irrelevant. Elegantly,
this approach was motivated by the knowledge that mammalian brains explicitly
process saliency as part of processing visual scenes [27]. It was also proposed
that the intermediate region could be “painted” by a human operator, a form of
Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) learning. This HITL aspect was validated by recent,
promising work with redirecting the salient region in an attention model based on
segmentation annotations [35]. That work, by Li et al., was made public on Feb.
27th, 2018, four days after the original proposal for this dissertation.
Our prior work with LCAs also points to a larger and more significant general
problem: how sparse can the input to a classifier be to still achieve a given level of
performance? This question is addressed in Section 3.4, though the answer depends
heavily on the problem being solved. To intuit the relation between sparsity and
ease of explanation, consider the problem of dictionary definitions. While many
definitions could be substantially longer to capture more connotations and usages,
and thus be slightly more accurate, a shorter definition is easier to understand.
Similarly, I wanted to generalize this idea to all two-stage information processing
pipelines. I observe that constricting the information shared between these two
pipelines to be as sparse as possible, while also preserving locality of the sparse
output, will generate a relevance mapping where the few non-zero elements indicate
significant information for the task implemented by the pipeline. Functionally,
this is similar to an autoencoder, but differs in a few ways: the dimension of the
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middle layer does not need to be smaller to be constricting, as we use a sparsity
loss to achieve a similar effect, and the second half of the network is not trying to
reconstruct the input, but is rather trying to accomplish a different task.
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Sensory Relevance Models via Network Bisection(s)
The general task of information or signal processing can be modeled as a function
that converts some input space X to some different output space Y . This input-
output mapping is loosely defined on purpose for most methods so that they may
have a broad applicability. For NNs, this generality has come at the cost of being
unable to intuit how the mapping function works.
Adequately understanding the internal operation of NNs, or the larger toolbox
of ML solutions in general, has recently become a primary difficulty of using them
[14]. Complications arising from the internal flexibility of NNs are epitomized in
adversarial examples: inputs with minor perturbations that completely change the
output of the network [2,10,15,61,63]. These reports all support that NNs solve an
underconstrained problem: many possible solutions to the training data exist on
manifolds which are distorted toward imperceptibility in standard visual space. As
such, overall accuracy on a sample dataset of an overall problem has become less
important than an ability to reason about the scope and function of ML techniques.
There have been both procedural and architectural attempts at understanding the
behavior of NNs as well as making them more resistant to adversarial examples;
Section 3.1 details these.
I add SRMs via Network Bisection to the field of explanation techniques. In
this case, the X → Y transformation is split up into a two-stage process, such
that an intermediate result is created, the SRM denoted as S(X). Since the
network’s transformation is now defined as S(X) → Y , an intuitive and reliable
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method of visualizing the SRM output would allow for unambiguous confirmation
of the aspects being considered by the NN. This work sought to answer: if all
information transmitted to the classifier were visualizable in a robust manner,
would that visualization be useful for debugging the network? Network bisection
is detailed throughout the rest of this chapter.
3.1 Related Work
Procedural attempts at understanding NNs primarily fall under the category of
either saliency maps or investigating receptive fields. Saliency maps are produced
by running back-propagation all the way to the input layer, and looking at which
pixels are most influential on the network’s output [59]. This approach has proven
useful for demonstrating what parts of the input are most important to a neural
network. Saliency maps have also been extended to aid in image segmentation
[21, 59]. By combining saliency maps from multiple, convolved classifications of a
source image, saliency maps have even been used to track an object across time
by updating the prior of the object’s position according to computed saliency
maps [21]. Studies of receptive fields have been primarily limited to investigating
the input patterns to which neurons at different levels in an NN respond [39,47,75].
By looking at these patterns, researchers have hoped to gain an intuition of the
internal functions of the networks.
However, as will be demonstrated further in Chapter 4, these post-hoc meth-
ods of explaining an NN’s intuitions suffer from incompatibility with adversarial
examples, perturbations of a small enough magnitude that they are invisible to a
human observer. The adversarial modifications do not correlate with the previ-
ously mentioned methods of explanation, and as such calls such explanations into
22
question.
Training modifications to make NNs more robust to adversarial inputs have
been proposed. A. Madry et al. have published several works on adversarial train-
ing, integrating adversarial examples into the training process to make a network
more robust [41,63]. Columbia University’s DeepXplore project is another project
that utilizes adversarial training; in their work, Pei et al. consider the automatic
generation of adversarial examples, and using these generated examples to increase
the training pool of the network [51]. Doing so forces the network to become a
better generalizer as adversarial examples are actively trained away. However, this
approach takes a significant amount of time, and while it is guaranteed to improve
a network’s resistance to adversarial examples, it remains very difficult to prove an
absence of adversarial examples. Likely, the neighborhood of possible adversarial
attacks exceeds the bounds tested by DeepXplore. One might imagine adversarial
attacks defined specifically closer to the boundaries of the network’s decisions than
a project like DeepXplore generates. Realistically, there are limits on how much
training a DeepXplore-like system can utilize, due to time and resource constraints.
A prior architectural extension of network design to make NNs more under-
standable is attention models [12, 64]. Where saliency maps demonstrate the
most-used pixels, attention models use a gating technique which involves mul-
tiplying the inputs by a learned mask to shape how inputs are forwarded to the
classifying portion of the network. Viewing the mask of the attention model shows
which inputs were weighted more heavily for a given input. My proposed network
bisection differs from attention models because network bisection transforms the
input while keeping it local, a much richer approach than the input gating ap-
proach used by traditional attention models (attention models from the last year
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have also incorporated this quality, e.g. [28]). Additionally, the network bisection
technique uses a method separate from classification loss to enforce sparsity in the
attentive layer (Section 3.3).
Outside of attempts to understand NNs and harden them against adversarial
examples, there are two developmentally significant seeds for the network bisection
SRM: one is the our work on Rozell et al.’s LCA [55], and the other is GANs [14].
The LCA was covered in Chapter 2.
GANs, introduced by Goodfellow et al. in 2014, rely on competition between
two NNs attempting to optimize different loss functions: a generator, which gen-
erates outputs similar to some reference input, and a discriminator, which takes
inputs from the generator and real inputs and attempts to discern which input was
real and which was generated [14]. As the discriminator learns to better recognize
real inputs, the generator must improve at generating fakes of the input. As the
generator learns to create better fake inputs, the discriminator must improve at
telling the two apart. Together, these networks compute a loss function that would
be impossible to design holistically. The network bisection SRM can be thought
of similarly: one network, the SRM, has the goal of transforming its input into
a maximally sparse output, while the second network, a classifier, must perform
classification based on the limited information passed by the SRM. While comput-
ing an optimal SRM directly would be impossible, computing it in tandem with a
corresponding output classifier makes the problem we are trying to solve feasible.
3.2 Theory
I proposed network bisection as a means of applying more structure to the X → Y
transformation, such that an intermediate result, the SRM denoted as S(X), would
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SRM Innovations
Easier to modify
Easier to interpret
Closer to how we learn
Input Ultrasound Target Mask
Traditional
SRM
Figure 3.1: SRMs via network bisection sought to provide an intermediate, compressed represen-
tation of input signals that would be useful for human-in-the-loop debugging of data processing
algorithms.
provide better insight into the mechanisms of the overall transformation. The
reasoning for bisection, and the necessary qualities of that bisection, are detailed
in this section.
3.2.1 Why Bisection?
The proposed architecture is illustrated in Fig. 3.1. Similar to the GANs devel-
oped by Goodfellow et al. [14], the SRM combines two separate machine learning
methods solving different, but related, problems. GANs are implemented in terms
of a generator, which transforms noise into a believable image, and a discriminator,
which takes one real image and one from the generator, and attempts to discern
which is the real image. A problem utilizing a network bisection SRM, on the
other hand, is implemented in terms of the SRM, which attempts to forward as
little information as possible, and a classifier, which attempts to score highly on a
given task based only on the input from the SRM. The composition of these two
networks solves the original information processing task.
Bisection SRMs necessarily can only express a subset of the operations available
with current state-of-the-art deep NNs. The SRM technique requires restricting
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some of the free dimensions of the NN; given enough input data (to prevent over-
fitting and ensure generalization), an unrestricted network would almost certainly
outperform the SRM formulation. On the other hand, convolutional layers are also
less expressive than fully-connected NNs, yet they have led to significantly more
accurate and robust networks [32].
Unrestricted networks are also known to be highly vulnerable to adversarial
attacks. Consider the recent work on ArXiv from MIT’s LabSix group [2]. This
group managed to 3D-print objects that Google’s Inception network would mis-
classify. For example, they 3D-printed a turtle model that always registered as
a rifle when passed to Google’s classifier, regardless of orientation [2]. This is a
significant problem: traditional neural networks cannot be used in production for
critical applications with such glaring flaws.
Restricting the input space of NNs has shown some promise at reducing the
effectiveness of adversarial attacks [19]. This was the SRM’s first potential benefit
over a traditional NN. The traditional NN might be learn to be more accurate with
enough data but should also be significantly easier to manipulate. By restricting
the intermediate space through sparsity, a bisection SRM would eliminate several
vectors of reasoning that would prevent it from generalizing well. In contrast to
attention models, where NNs may still utilize high gain on elements which are
scaled as unimportant, the bisection SRM would completely mask out elements,
giving them zero influence on the final network decision.
The second proposed unique benefit of the SRM arose from its construction as
two separate pieces. Consider how people learn to solve problems and generalize
well. Studies on student learning have investigated the differences between how
experts and novices approach problems [60]. These studies tend to conclude that
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experts develop a repertoire of “schemas” which can be applied to filter larger
problems into a manageable (and efficient to solve) set of smaller problems [60].
The overall result, in the context of humans, is that a novice with the proper tools
can solve the same problems as an expert, but far less efficiently and with greater
cognitive stress [60]. A more recent study compares learning between students
given feedback in the form of worked examples or tutoring versus basic correctness
feedback [43]. Similarly, McLaren et al. conclude that providing worked examples
as opposed to only correctness feedback greatly improved the efficiency of learning,
but not the overall accuracy of the material learned [43].
Applied to information processing tasks, this implies that an efficient means of
teaching generalizable solutions might require access to worked solutions. While
part of what makes NNs so widely applicable is their genericism, and the fact that
designing a system only requires constructing input-output pairs and a network
architecture, this is also likely what is holding back further understanding and
development of the function space realizable by NNs. By formulating the SRM
as a local, sparse transformation of the input, it is guaranteed that the output
could be interpreted by a human operator. This was the fundamental requirement
of our system: that a human expert be able to see, given some input, which
parts of that input were used to make the final classification. As this middle
layer would be visualizable, tools could be developed to manipulate the SRM layer
directly, changing the system’s idea of which parts of a given input are relevant, and
adjusting the classification layer accordingly to rely on only the input information
that is most significant.
Analogous to specifying the middle steps of an information processing task,
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this could have enabled a new type of feedback unexplored by previous NN ar-
chitectures. Prior efforts to counter-act adversarial examples have been limited
to generating adversarial examples and training the network to classify them cor-
rectly [41, 51], or restricting the input space directly, without concern to how this
might affect the overall task [19]. Bisection SRMs would allow a human operator
to directly point out which part of the input space is the most important, signif-
icantly reducing the possibility of the network honing in on the wrong aspect of
the input, and improving its ability to generalize.
3.2.2 Required Traits
The implementation of the bisection SRM relied on defining two sub-problems
of the greater information processing problem. A formal definition of the overall
task of our system relied on some desired function Y = f(X), where Y is the M -
dimensional output space of the problem, andX is the N -dimensional input space.
Our task is to find an approximate Ŷ = f̂(X) that minimizes some loss L[Y , Ŷ ].
The SRM arose by defining f̂(X) = C(S(X)), where C is the final classifier that
shapes the output of the SRM, S. We then could define loss functions for each of
these:
LS [S(X)] = g
(
λC(S(X)), L[Y , Ŷ ]
)
,
LC[C(S(X))] = L[Y , Ŷ ], (3.1)
where λC(·) has the same meaning as in Eq. (2.1) of the LCA, a sparsity penalty
term, and g(·) is a function to combine the sparsity and classifier output losses
(often a weighted sum). Note that, if a desired SRM output Ŝ(x) is specified, and
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L[S(X), Ŝ(X)] is defined as the Mean-Square-Error (MSE) between the norms
per unit-space of X of the two, then both stages of the pipeline may have their
respective losses minimized. This would enable a human operator to specify an
ideal SRM output and simultaneously converge the SRM to recognize that region
as relevant and converge C to perform the desired task using only that information.
This exact approach was shown to be practical by Li et al., who used the Grad-
CAM algorithm as a basis rather than network bisection [35].
Ignoring the other requirements of an SRM for a moment, we earlier demon-
strated a combined loss function on S(X) of g(a, b) = a + b in Fig. 2.1. Indeed,
what was derived in that work could be considered a proto-SRM. However, that
model possessed neither the locality nor the correct form of sparsity required for
a true SRM. To address this gap, we apply three restrictions to S(X):
1. The output must be in a similar space to X.
2. Each element of the output must rely primarily on inputs local to its spatial
point.
3. Sparsity of the output alone is an insufficient restriction; sparsity must be
evaluated in the original space of X.
Point 1 refers to the similarity between the output space of X and S(X). One
of the primary purposes of the network bisection SRM was to make it easier to
interpret what an ML technique is deeming relevant. In this light, the SRM could
be thought of as a saliency map with an extra dimension containing transformed
values that are fed into the final classifier. As such, the ability to re-cast the output
to the original space to render overlays is imperative. An important note, if the
input is a 32×32×3 Red-Green-Blue (RGB) image, then 16×16×3, 32×32×32,
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and 8 × 32 × 3 would all be valid shapes for S(X). The input space may be re-
scaled, even non-uniformly, and its depth may be infinitely extended, so long as
the SRM implements point 2, that output elements rely primarily on inputs local
to their spatial points. Point 1 is trivial to implement: simply define the SRM’s
output in a way that retains the space of its input.
Point 2 gives the output of the SRM meaning. Presenting an image of a similar
space is meaningless if calculations are non-local. Without a locality restriction,
activity at the top of the input image might indicate that the bottom of the image
has all of the important features, which is not a useful transformation when it
comes to explaining relevance. The full scope of implementations for this point is
an open question; the trivial solution with neural networks, and the one explored
in this dissertation, was to define the SRM purely in terms of a limited number
of convolutions. For example, an NN that has two convolutional layers, each with
a kernel width of 5, would result in a locality of 5 + 4 = 9 around each input
element. By never inserting a dense layer, locality is preserved. Some problems
may benefit from more eccentric means of implementing this restriction. Consider a
race car driving on a track. The inputs to the network controlling the car are a top-
down image of the race car and its immediate surroundings, and the car’s current
velocity. When considering to brake, the velocity would be incredibly important in
determining whether or not the surroundings are relevant. There are at least two
ways to address this with an SRM while satisfying the second restriction: have the
SRM separately consider the relevance of velocity and visually the objects that the
race car might collide with; or assume that the velocity is relevant, and discard
that element from the output space, focusing on the image. Either would produce
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a valid SRM, and each would highlight different features. Not giving the image-
filtering part of the SRM access to velocity would force it to always be aware of
potential collisions, which might be easier for a human operator when assigning
relevance. On the other hand, including speed would allow a human operator to
check whether or not the race car is properly avoiding obstacles when going fast,
and when going slow, is driving in the right direction on the track. Locality is a
flexible topic. It is a requirement for network bisection SRMs to provide insight,
but different expressions of the locality requirement will lead to advantages and
disadvantages specific to each problem domain. Locality might even be generally
modeled as another loss term, minimizing a distance heuristic between the SRM’s
output and its reliance on different spatial points of X.
Point 3, that sparsity on the similar space must be evaluated on the original
space, comes from the fact that the SRM’s output consists of multiple channels,
similar to how an RGB image has multiple color channels at each spatial pixel.
Functionally, due to the locality property of SRMs, there must be some aspect
similar to convolution in any SRM. As a result, different relevant aspects of the
input at each spatial point in X must be passed in a channel perpendicular to
the spatial dimensions of X. Consider that visualizing the SRM will consist of
displaying the norm of the perpendicular space at each spatial point in X. Were
sparsity defined in terms of both the space of the input and this perpendicular
space, it would be very possible that each spatial point of X would have one
corresponding output active in S(X). Rendering this as an overlay of X would be
almost impossible to display to a human operator in a meaningful way. For this to
be useful, sparsity must be defined in terms of X’s space. This was implemented
by crafting λC(·) to evaluate sparsity with respect to the norms at each spatial
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point in X.
The requirements of the network bisection SRM were therefore well-defined.
The implementation of this theory is discussed in Section 3.3.
3.3 Implementations and Results
As per Section 3.2.2, a bisection SRM requires restrictions on the output from the
SRM layer. I experimented with two varieties of achieving sparsity: one by ad-
justing the activity levels in a standard network, and another by using secondary
networks at each bisection to integrate gradients and determine which spatial lo-
cations were important.
3.3.1 Activity Adjustment
Multi-layer neural networks, including the ResNet [16], often utilize the Rectified
Linear Unit (ReLU) as a non-linearity. Conveniently for the definition of SRMs,
the ReLU transmits no information when its input argument has a value of less
than zero, illustrated in Fig. 3.2. Thus, one viable means of implementing an
SRM as specified in Section 3.2.2 is to simply add a loss at some desired bisection
point immediately before a ReLU operation, moving the decision surface up or
down such that the non-zero elements that will come out of the ReLU will fit the
sparsity requirements of an SRM (Fig. 3.2). The loss would be applied prior to
the ReLU so that the network could be encouraged to produce more outputs when
the SRM loss resulted in too sparse of an output.
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Figure 3.2: Network bisection SRMs require a high level of sparsity, which may be achieved
through the ReLU operations already present in many NNs. The NN’s output at any given layer
may be made more or less sparse simply by moving the entire decision surface one direction or
another through an auxiliary loss (Eq. (3.14)).
3.3.1.1 Methodology
ResNets are divided into several super blocks, all but the first being preceded by a
batch normalization layer, an activation layer, and an average pooling layer. In a
CIFAR10 network, where inputs are 32×32, there are 3 super blocks, and the final
classification result is calculated from a globally averaged pool across the resulting
8× 8 feature map [16]. The beginnings of these super blocks, following the batch
normalization and preceding the activation and average pooling layers, are natural
points to bisect a network in an effort to understand its function.
To prevent degeneracy, where the SRM over-emphasizes sparsity and passes
no information to the classifier, the sparsity loss and task-specific losses must
be balanced against one another. One method of achieving this balance is by
introduction a term for sparsity homeostasis, where a specific average amount
of activation in S(X) is targeted. Targeting an average amount of activity is a
technique frequently used in unsupervised learning problems [69], and makes the
sparsity problem more concerned with forwarding the correct information than
determining how much information to forward. By adjusting the portion of space
in X that has a non-zero norm across S(X), I was also able to target different
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quantities of the input image being highlighted by the explanation.
To hit such a homeostasis point the SRM loss needed to be balanced against
the classification loss. It seemed sensible to begin by using a PI controller designed
to target an average activity level in the SRM’s output. Here, activity level refers
to the percentage of input pixels which could have affected the final classification
decision. In a traditional ResNet, basically every convolution uses a 3× 3 feature
map, meaning each spatial element is allowed to pull in information from its neigh-
bors. To achieve point 2 of Section 3.2.2, I modified the ResNet such that most
convolutions only used a 1 × 1 filter, and 3 × 3 filters were allowed only prior to
the final output from each block. These modifications allow for the neighborhood
of input pixels which might affect a pixel at the SRM level to be precisely calcu-
lated. The total active input area may then be calculated. For example, if two
3 × 3 convolutional kernels are allowed prior to the SRM layer, then each SRM
pixel is affected by a 5 × 5 patch of the original input. If one pixel had activity
at the SRM level in a 10 × 10 image, then the final activity level would be 25 %.
In practice, these activity levels were calculated by dilating the SRM layer by its
neighborhood size, clipping to the original image’s dimensions, and then measuring
the percentage passed.
Through the PI controller, the sparsifying loss would only be applied with
significant magnitude when the average-case input resulted in more of the input’s
spatial domain being utilized than desired, and otherwise the sparsifying loss would
be decreased such that the classification loss could optimize the final objective. In
order to utilize as much of the network as possible, the target sparsity was adjusted
from 100 % (utilizing the full image) to a target percentage throughout training,
using a cosine annealing schedule. To prevent domain issues, the inhibition or
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excitation of elements in the SRM were clamped by two constants, α and β. These
served to prevent elements that were frequently inhibited from becoming too neg-
ative and ceasing to participate in the network’s training. Altogether, the loss for
the SRM was:
r(t), the accumulated sparsity error, (3.2)
r(0) = 0, (3.3)
c, the number of features in the SRM layer, (3.4)
y, the height of the SRM layer, (3.5)
x, the width of the SRM layer, (3.6)
s(t), the output of the SRM, a c× y × x matrix, (3.7)
atarget, the target percentage of the input passed, (3.8)
areal(t), the actual percentage of the input passed, (3.9)
areal(t) =
(∑
dilate(max(s(t) across c) > 0)
)
/(yx), (3.10)
α = −0.54, (3.11)
β = 0.1, (3.12)
ω(t) = e−4.2+0.2|r(t)|, (3.13)
Lsrm(t) = ω(t)
∑

max(s(t)− α, 0)2, if areal(t) > atarget and r(t) > 0
max(β − s(t), 0)2, if areal(t) < atarget and r(t) < 0
0. otherwise
, (3.14)
r(t+ 1) = r(t) + areal(t)− atarget. (3.15)
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Above, (t) denotes a time index. This loss decreases activity only for input
samples which violate the sparsity constraint and only when the overall network
needs to be more sparse, and is capable of increasing activity when the network
becomes overly sparse. The exponential factor on the error integration, ω(t), keeps
the loss function responsive to sudden changes in the network. Note that all
constants were optimized for validation accuracy via a distributed search utilizing
a swarm of hill climbers.
3.3.1.2 Results
A basic SRM consisting of several convolutional layers leading to the SRM output
leading to several more convolutional layers, a global averaging layer, and finally
a fully-connected layer was built using PyTorch [49] and applied to the CIFAR-
10 dataset [31]. Batch normalization was used after each convolutional layer’s
activation, which was chosen as ReLU. The test networks had 573k parameters in
total. The SRM’s requirements from Section 3.2.2 were realized 1. by zero-padding
the convolution output to preserve the same dimensionality as the input, 2. by
composing the SRM as a set of convolutions, and 3. as the above auxiliary loss,
Lsrm(t), applied to the SRM output that emphasized sparsity on a dilation of the
spatial elements forwarded by the SRM to the second half of the NN.
Shown in Fig. 3.3 are the error rates through training on CIFAR-10 for a
network with and without the SRM loss component, targeting a final activity level
of 95 %. The addition of the SRM loss consistently improved results on CIFAR-10,
boosting the error rate down to 8.0 % with the SRM loss compared to a 8.2 %
error rate without the SRM loss, a 2.4 % reduction in error rate. Note also that
the training error for the SRM is higher, but the test error is lower - indicating
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Figure 3.3: Example comparison on CIFAR-10 task between an SRM network with a 90 % sparsity
target and a traditional, non-SRM network. Each batch consisted of 64 training examples.
better generalization properties.
While small, this improvement was non-trivial, as approaching an error rate
of 0 % becomes increasingly more difficult. An improvement in testing accuracy
showed that restricting the expressible space as specified in Section 3.2 encourages
the NN to learn the right kind of generalizations. This result was with a rudimen-
tary SRM; improving the regularization quality of the SRM for a more significant
improvement in accuracy is one goal of this dissertation.
A separate experiment was targeted at 26 % final sparsity. The SRM’s output,
shown in Fig. 3.4, clearly shows that the network learned to consider only the
relevant portions of the input. This figure was generated with different sparsity
settings than Fig. 3.3, and resulted in doubled error rates, but showed the feasibility
of interpretable results via an SRM. The images second-from-the-right show that
only features relevant to the classification of the picture were transformed and
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Figure 3.4: Example inputs (left), SRM activations before clipping (left-middle), SRM activations
after clipping (middle), and actual regions of input used for final classification (right-middle).
The right-most image is the same visualization as the SRM outputs applied to a traditional NN
that does not use point 3 of Section 3.2.2.
passed to the classification network. In the elk example, the horns and torso were
enough to confidently identify the animal, whereas with the fixed-wing aircraft, the
wing, its landing gear, and the curvature of the fuselage were all deemed significant
to classification. A traditional network rendered with this technique shows activity
everywhere, and the magnitudes are difficult to interpret.
While these initial results were promising, they did not provide resistance to
adversarial examples. Somewhat counter-intuitively, even though only 26 % of the
input space was used in the final classification, adversarial attacks against this net-
work were of a similar or smaller magnitude as attacks against a traditional, non-
SRM network. Furthermore, multiple bisections with this method were somewhat
obtuse as the target activity level at each region would fix that layer’s behavior.
The goal of SRMs was to produce explainable networks, not to constrain them
unnecessarily. As such, another technique for producing SRMs out of network
bisections was explored.
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3.3.2 Gradient Integration Method
As mentioned in Section 3.1, gradient information has been used in the past as a
means of understanding the operation of NNs in the context of individual input ex-
amples. While no information on the neighborhood for which gradient information
remains valid is demonstrated by these methods, they do produce a linear approx-
imation of the most relevant parts of each input. This information is very noisy,
however; see Fig. 3.5. Even small, random changes in the input or network can
change the saliency map significantly. Adversarial attacks change the saliency map
even more significantly. This indicates that gradient information at the network’s
input is not a stable indicator of the calculations performed by the network. Given
how non-linear NNs are, this is not terribly surprising. Nonetheless, the relevance
of gradient information to a network’s calculations is undeniable.
This section of my work focuses on providing an SRM via a relevancy filter-
ing mechanism. Gradient information cannot be ignored as a potential source of
relevancy information, and as such this section revolves around exploring ways
to utilize that information that both would not impede the network’s ability to
perform inference and would provide some intuition.
3.3.2.1 Methodology
This work concerns an SRM achieved via network bisection by inserting Gradient
Integration Modules (GIMs) as shown in Fig. 3.6. We start with the pre-activation
version of ResNet-44, from [17]. The batch normalization operation is typically
defined in two parts: a normalizing step and a set of affine transformations which
give flexibility to the output distribution [26]. We insert the GIM module between
these two stages of the batch normalization operation. Each GIM contains a
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.5: Saliency map given an input for both (a) original input, (b) random perturbation,
and (c) adversarial perturbation. Note that the saliency maps change drastically based on minor
changes to the input.
secondary, approximating network that maps feature vectors to a statistic relating
whether or not those vectors are relevant to the overall network’s loss function.
This approximating network is detached from the primary network - that is, its
gradients are not backpropagated beyond the input to the approximation network.
Detaching the statistics network allows the primary network to focus solely on
its loss function, as it would without the SRM modifications. The approximating
network’s output is used to set channels deemed irrelevant to zero, which thanks
to the normalizing part of the batch normalization module, is the expected value.
After this gating, the learnable scale and bias are applied, followed by a ReLU. The
only difference between this arrangement and the original pre-activation ResNet-
44 is that there is a chance for each piece of information to be reset to the batch
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Figure 3.6: Architecture of network, using GIM modules to produce an SRM. At top is the
architecture for a traditional ResNet - note that the “GIM” modules do not exist in a traditional
network, and are underlined in red to note this. The inputs to an NN are typically already zero-
mean and unit-variance, hence the lack of a batch normalization around the first GIM module.
Within the Pre-block, the GIM is inserted between the two steps of the batch normalization
operation (normalization and the subsequent affine operations, which are added to support a
wider variety of output distributions). Within the GIM, a detached version of the information
into the module is sent to a statistics network, which in turn produces a spatial mask by which
features are multiplied, as per Section 3.3.2. The loss function used to train the statistics network
is specified in Section 3.3.2.
normalization module’s learnable bias value. The modification by the GIM is thus
strictly a binary operation applied at each spatial point - all channels at each
point are either preserved or dropped. Whether or not the drop occurs depends
on statistics unavailable to the NN’s backpropagation, and as such cannot be
amplified directly in a way that leads to complex behavior. Rather, the NN must
configure itself to work around these drops in order to achieve good accuracy with
the increased sparsity.
As mentioned previously, gradient information is unreliable. Even with an
identical input, minor changes to the network will produce significant changes in
the gradient information. We address this by considering the vector of information
at each spatial point in the input, which produces a smoothing effect due to the
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number of gradients included, and also by storing this information through an
integrator rather than trying to store it precisely via an L2-norm.
The traditional method of storing non-classification data in an NN is via the
L2-norm, otherwise known as the Mean-Squared Error (MSE) loss function. The
MSE is typically preferred because, given enough gradient descent steps, the final
solution is stable. That is, there is a point at which the sum of gradients across
all training examples will be zero, even if several training examples have identical
inputs and different outputs:
L = (y − ŷ)2,
∂L
∂ŷ
= −2(y − ŷ),
x0 → y = 1, x1 → y = 0, x2 → y = 0,
0 =
∑
xi
∂L
∂ŷ
.
On the other hand, an integrator stores the mode, not the mean, and as such
is unstable:
L = ŷy,
∂L
∂ŷ
= y,
0 6=
∑
xi
∂L
∂ŷ
.
Ordinarily, this instability is undesirable. However, integrators are good at
filtering out high-frequency noise. For unreliable information, where attempting
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to store a stable, converged value is nearly impossible, the integrator is a reasonable
choice.
Assume that the input to the GIM at each spatial point is a vector ~x com-
posed of N channels. When considering if that information vector is necessary for
classification, we want to measure the dangers of reassigning ~x = ~0. Then, the
natural way to store gradient information in the SRM as a relevancy statistic y for
a corresponding spatial point with input ~x and a corresponding gradient gi might
be:
Ly = y
N∑
i=1
−xigi.
However, there are several issues with this. For one, gi is a linear approximation
of a highly non-linear system; relative to the magnitude of xi, it might change
drastically. Second, the gradient will in turn affect subsequent values of xi, as
SGD progresses. Thus, rather than xi, we use its sign:
Ly = y
N∑
i=1
−sgn(xi)gi.
In practice, one additional alteration is beneficial. SGD is used with such
high learning rates that supervised NNs often overshoot their target values. This
leads to chaotic interactions amongst parameters such that the expected value of
each gradient is almost zero. While the above integrator equation would even-
tually filter out this high-frequency information, it is easiest for us to rectify the
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signal immediately using a ramp function r(·), and only consider the positive con-
tributions of each spatial point. Additionally, to keep some negative values, we
introduce a constant c:
Ly = y
([
N∑
i=1
r(−sgn(xi)gi)
]
− c
)
, (3.16)
c =
λ
Y
Y∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
r(−sgn(xi,j)gi,j), (3.17)
where Y is the number of spatial points with statistics being calculated. That
is, c is based on the entire image input, whereas Ly is based predominantly on
information at the spatial point being considered for relevancy.
This loss equation implements an integrator that approaches inf when the ex-
pected contribution to the primary network loss is greater than c, and approaches
− inf when the expected contribution is less than c. During backpropagation,
while training our networks, we have no need to consider only local values. As
such, we can set c as some constant λ times the average contribution across the en-
tire image. This guarantees that only uniquely beneficial information approaches
inf, while information that is less than average approaches − inf. The constant λ
allows us to control the sparsity of the final stored values. To enforce stability, we
clamp the loss if y > 1 and the loss function would cause y to increase further, or
if y < −1 and the loss function would cause y to decrease. Values of the stored
statistic y greater than or equal to 0 were transmitted to the second half of the
network, while values of y less than zero resulting in the corresponding information
vector being reset to ~0.
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3.3.2.2 Results
A ResNet-44 [16] was used for these trials, again using PyTorch [49] and applied to
the CIFAR-10 dataset [31]. The requirements for a useful network bisection SRM,
from Section 3.2.2, were satisfied the same as in Section 3.3.1, except for point
3. Point 3, the requirement of sparsity in the spatial domain of the input, was
not guaranteed unless a sufficient number of spatial points at the SRM layer were
less than zero as described in the methodology section. Multiple different values
of λ from Eq. (3.17) were tried, with similar results. Note that λ > 1 would be
unstable, and any questionably-useful spatial locations would default to not being
transmitted to the classifier half of the network.
Since the statistics network for the GIM is detached from the standard net-
work, one nicety of the GIM approach is that measurements may be taken without
affecting the network if the zeroing of feature vectors is disabled. For these exper-
iments, the GIM module replaced the batch normalization preceding all 3 super
blocks and the final, global average pooling layer. However, only the GIM module
leading into the 3rd super block was allowed to filter statistically irrelevant spatial
locations in the SRM.
Using λ = 0.9, a ResNet-44 implementation which scored 92.2 % accuracy
instead scored 94.0 % accuracy with the GIM filtering. This improvement is
consistent with other attention literature on similarly-sized networks on CIFAR-
10 [28,65].
The spatial regions of the input which registered as significant with the GIMs
are demonstrated in Fig. 3.7. Note that either increasing λ or decreasing the
learning rate of the GIM resulted in a sparser intermediate representation, with
λ = 0.99 scoring an accuracy of 93.6 % and the combination of λ = 0.99 with a
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Figure 3.7: Example GIM activations on several images. The full-color images are the inputs;
the following four columns are GIM activations before the first, second, and third super blocks,
and finally before the global averaging layer. Only the third column of GIM activations were
used to affect the network; the others were passive observers. Black indicates a GIM output of
−1, red indicates a GIM output of just below zero, and white indicates a spatial location which
was passed on to the final classification result, with a brighter white being closer to 1. The three
rows illustrate three different networks: one with λ = 0.9, another with λ = 0.99, and a third
with both λ = 0.99 and the learning rate for the GIM module set to 0.01 times the learning rate
of the parent network, allowing for more gradual learning of relevance statistics. Note that the
final column of each of these is a flat color, indicating no meaningful statistics were captured at
that level.
learning rate of 0.01 times the base network learning rate scoring an accuracy of
93.4 %. While the statistics do, by definition, show significant patterns at each
level in the network, it is impossible to express with certainty why these patterns
were considered significant, or what would need to change in the input image to
change the final classification result.
3.4 Discussion
While the above formulations of a network bisection SRM worked well enough to
appear useful at first inspection, the results were discouraging in several ways.
Adversarial examples against these networks - even with the very sparse net-
work from Fig. 3.4 - were of comparable or lesser Root-Mean-Square Error (RMSE)
as adversarial attacks against images on a traditional network with the Lsrm(t)
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loss. Even though the majority of the input image was unused in the final clas-
sification, adversarial attacks against the network resulting in similar-magnitude
perturbations on the unmasked input elements, resulting in a lower RMSE overall.
In other words, while the second half of the network was making decisions based
on objectively fewer input elements, it seemed that those input elements in turn
demonstrated a greater effect on the output of the network.
A second disappointment of this approach was that when the network misclassi-
fied an image, the saliency maps at the SRM level were not necessarily informative.
The highlighted regions often denoted the whole salient object, even though the
resulting classification was incorrect. The introduction of this dissertation referred
to Jetley et al.’s work on attention models [28], shown in Fig. 1.1. Similar to the
network bisection SRM presented in this dissertation, Jetley et al.’s model could
convincingly highlight salient regions, yet still produced classification errors. The
SRM could theoretically be used to craft more informative saliency maps based on
which features were forwarded, rather than the binarization of whether or not any
features were forwarded, but that would also be vulnerable to adversarial examples.
A third disappointment of this approach was that hierarchies were not very
informative. While the GIM approach was capable of producing hierarchies (Sec-
tion 3.3.2), the produced hierarchies did not seem very useful with regards to
diagnosing the network’s flaws or reasoning. These hierarchies were more or less
consistent with either Li et al.’s [35] or Jetley et al.’s [28] works. However, in light
of adversarial examples, the utility of any of such explanations is questionable.
The failures of network bisection SRMs were thus apparent at this point. Com-
pared to previous explanation methods, they shared the same lack of resistance to
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adversarial examples, and ultimately were still a heatmap-based method of expla-
nation, which was identified as having limited utility in explaining why a region
was important.
Section 2.4 raised the question of how accuracy might degrade as the input to
the classifier became more sparse. As with attention models, a mild restriction on
the classifier’s input improved performance. However, the model which only sent
26 % of the input to the classifier resulted in a classification accuracy of 75 %, down
from 92 %. Therefore, it is safe to assume that this shall remain a general problem,
which each dataset having its own curve of sparsity versus achievable accuracy.
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4
Sensory Relevance Models via Adversarial Explanations
Despite classifying based on a small number of pixels from the input image, network
bisection SRMs were susceptible to adversarial attacks of an RMSE comparable
to those against traditional networks. Furthermore, they shared the flaws of other
methods of explaining NNs, as heatmaps only highlight a region without indicating
the significance of that region. Compare this to software for editing grammar: only
highlighting a piece tells you nothing about why it was highlighted, leaving the
user to guesswork (here because the word “piece” is awkward). All grammar edit-
ing solutions offer at least mouse-over help explaining the highlight. Explanation
methods for NNs, which utilize only heatmaps, are missing this vital information.
Figure 1.2 demonstrates the ambiguity of applying a heatmap-based explanation
to a classification problem.
To elucidate the failures of traditional explanation methods for NNs, and the
failures of network bisection SRMs, it was necessary to devise a scheme which
achieved the original goals of the SRM. One of the failings of heatmap-based meth-
ods was that all of them were necessarily produced via linearizations of a highly
non-linear network. The network bisection SRMs did not possess this particular
issue, but the neighborhood of validity for the network’s decision around any in-
put image was tiny, demonstrated by adversarial examples. It was determined in
Chapter 3 that reducing the portion of the input used to make a decision did not
increase the magnitude of adversarial examples. Therefore, a successful means of
explaining NNs would require further analysis of adversarial examples.
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Figure 4.1: While adversarial examples are considered a nuisance by most, they have the potential
to provide reliable explanations with the same richness of information as the original input. For
example, when an NN trained at finding lung nodules in radiographs needs investigation (a,
b), an attack may be targeted at a desired new network output—such as changing a nodule
classification to a non-nodule classification (c) or emphasizing the nodule (d)—to produce a new
image which is minimally changed but produces the desired output. By comparing these inputs
and looking at the differences, a human operator can identify relevant features in the input with
greater fidelity than current methods.
At this point, it became clear that adversarial examples themselves might pro-
vide useful explanations. Adversarial examples are functionally equivalent to push-
ing the input toward or away from decision boundaries. This is illustrated in
Fig. 4.1.
This line of work was successful, and advanced the field of explanation methods
for neural networks in a meaningful way. As a result, adversarial explanations were
detailed in the attached work, Appendix A.1. Much of this chapter is taken from
that paper, inserted here to provide the main text of this dissertation with a
complete and contained narrative.
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4.1 Related Work
Three branches of ML inquiry led to this work: adversarial attacks, explanation
techniques, and Human-In-The-Loop (HITL) methods. A mathematical branch,
Lipschitz continuity, was also important in developing this work. These four related
areas are discussed in Sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.4.
4.1.1 Adversarial Attacks
The struggle between adversarial attacks and methods of resisting them is perhaps
best illustrated by the saddle point formulation proposed by Madry et al. [41]
(notation adapted to be consistent throughout the current paper):
minE(x,t)∼D
[
max
δ∈S
L(θ, x+ δ, t)
]
. (4.1)
That is, find the network parameterized as θ which, according to dataset D, pro-
duces the best approximation of some target t when the worst-case noise δ con-
strained by an allowed attack space S is added to an input x. This formulation
illustrates the difficulty of working against a high-quality adversary, which is rela-
tively unrestricted in its exploitation of the network’s properties around x.
Methods of generating adversarial attacks approximate the inner maximiza-
tion problem from Eq. (4.1). Carlini et al. [10] compared several different methods
of generating attacks, including Goodfellow et al.’s Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [15] and their own Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [10]. Carlini et al.
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[10] showed that attacks were transferable between networks, regardless of net-
work architecture. One interpretation of this would be that NNs emphasize high-
frequency signals within the data over low-frequency signals, biasing them toward
changes which are imperceptible in the domain of the input. Recent work by
Tsipras et al. [63] argued that this might be due to the natural tendency of high-
accuracy classifiers to exploit small differences as a means of greedily leveraging
available information.
Methods of providing robustness against adversarial attacks approximate the
outer minimization problem from Eq. (4.1). To our knowledge, state-of-the-art
methods of resisting adversarial attacks currently revolve around either adversarial
training [41,51,63] or randomized smoothing [11].
Madry et al. [41] investigated using both the FGSM and PGD methods of
generating adversarial examples, and the effects of using these methods to train
networks, a technique called adversarial training. Note that, under adversarial
training, a network is consistently trained based on its worst performance point
in the neighborhood of each input. While training with adversarial examples was
shown to somewhat reduce the transferability of attacks, they found that attacks
still produced a significant reduction in NN accuracy. They also argued that any
defense mechanism shown to be robust against PGD would be robust against other
first-order attacks [41]. That group later expanded their theories on adversarial
training in work by Tsipras et al. [63], demonstrating salient features materializ-
ing in adversarial examples with large limits on allowed attacks. These attacks
used perturbation magnitudes which greatly surpassed the threshold at which the
classifier’s accuracy would necessarily change, but for the first time demonstrated
that classifiers could potentially be used for generation.
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Cohen et al. [11] recently improved on a body of work called randomized
smoothing, a provable method of inducing L2 robustness based on evaluating a
smoothed version of a network trained with Gaussian noise. Unlike techniques
such as Madry et al.’s [41] or our work in Section 4.2, Cohen et al.’s method allows
for a certifiable calculation of an adversarial resistance bound. That is, there may
or may not be attacks against networks that exist, but are difficult to find with
PGD. If these attacks exist, Cohen et al.’s method provides a high level of confi-
dence that the smoothed network would also protect against them, even though
these attacks cannot currently be generated. The price of this certainty comes
with somewhat inflated processing time: predicting requires about 100 evaluations
for each input to properly compute the smoothing function [11].
Other defensive techniques have been proposed but were either inadequately
tested or shown to be broken. An approach which denoised inputs won the
NIPS 2017 adversarial robustness challenge [33, 36], which was successful but
defended against a static set of attacks against a standard network rather than
against attacks specific to the defended network. A number of stochastic and
non-differentiable defenses have been proposed and subsequently shown to be vul-
nerable to attacks which take these qualities into account [3].
We note that a roundup of best-practices for ensuring that new defenses are
effective was recently authored by Carlini et al. [9]. In the context of the current
work, we’ve complied with many of their recommendations, excepting non-gradient
based attacks and an investigation of attack transferability. As our proposed tech-
niques only affect network regularization (Section 4.2) or make gradients less ob-
fuscated (Section 4.2.4), sticking to a gradient-based PGD-variant attack seemed
sufficient. Attack transferability was not investigated as the proposed models have
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Figure 4.2: Compared to the state-of-the-art, our method achieved higher accuracy while be-
ing tolerant of greater adversarial perturbations on both ImageNet (Fig. 4.2a) and CIFAR-10
(Fig. 4.2b). By measuring the ARA, a model’s resistance to adversarial attacks is taken into con-
sideration alongside its ability to make predictions better than the naive baseline (the hatched
region). See Section 4.1.1 for additional details.
* Madry et al. used a network that was 10× as wide as a traditional ResNet-110, and also trained
against an Linf adversary rather than an L2 adversary [41].
† This curve came from personal communication with A. Madry on a standard ResNet-50; see
Section 4.1.1 for details.
identical architectures and processing, and therefore, for a given input, increasing
the required attack perturbation magnitude necessitates that an attack would not
transfer.
For comparing adversarial defense techniques, the current work used accuracy-
versus-attack-magnitude plots, such as Fig. 4.2. This type of plot shows how an
individual classifier’s accuracy would fall as the allowable attack space S increased.
For consistency across datasets, regardless of their input dimensions, we used the
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Root-Mean-Squared Error (RMSE) for the shown attack distances, which is equal
to the L2 norm of the perturbation divided by the square root of the number of
elements in the perturbation. The RMSE is a more natural choice as it is scaled
such that an RMSE of 0 means no change and an RMSE of 1 means the change
between an all-black and all-white image, regardless of size. Figures shown in this
work have scaled e.g. ε and other values reported in other works to the RMSE
scale. Cohen et al. [11] presented this plot for L2 attacks against both ImageNet
and CIFAR-10 results, and Madry et al. [41] presented this plot for L2 attacks
against a CIFAR-10 classifier with 10× the normal number of filters and trained
against Linf adversarial examples. Personal communication with A. Madry yielded
the additional curve on Fig. 4.2, which was for a standard CIFAR-10 ResNet-50
trained against L2 attacks with ε = 0.009; we independently trained a similar
network using their methods and achieved similar results, and show improved
results for adversarial training with a slightly different adversary (Section 4.3.1.15).
To compare these curves using a single number, we’ve used the area between the
curves of a naive classifier and the classifier in question, a metric we’ve termed the
classifier’s Accuracy-Robustness Area (ARA). The ARA is illustrated in Fig. 4.2b,
where the shaded area for each classifier is the area computed for the ARA. We
found that, on CIFAR-10, a standard ResNet-44 had an ARA of 0.0013, extrapo-
lating numbers from Madry et al.’s best L2 resistant network (from personal com-
munication) yielded an ARA of 0.0124, and Cohen et al.’s numbers yield an ARA
of 0.0065. A reproduction of Madry et al.’s best L2 resistant network, but as a
ResNet-44 instead of ResNet-50 and using our algorithm for evaluating ARA in
Section 4.2.1.1, yielded an ARA of 0.0104. On ImageNet 2012, a standard ResNet-
18 had an ARA of 0.0004 and Cohen et al. used their method to demonstrate an
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ARA of 0.0022.
4.1.2 Explanation Methods
Inadequate understanding of the internal operation of NNs, or the larger toolbox
of ML solutions in general, has recently come under focus as a primary difficulty
of using them [4,34,44,54,58,59].
Preliminary attempts at addressing this problem involved looking at saliency
maps computed via backpropagation to see which input pixels had the largest effect
on the classification [21,59] or looking at the receptive fields to which internal nodes
respond [4, 39, 47, 75]. However, these techniques often produce very noisy images
that are difficult to interpret.
Works such as Ribeiro et al.’s LIME [54] or Selvaraju et al.’s Grad-CAM [58]
proposed improvements over raw saliency maps. These works highlighted the diffi-
culty of identifying the reason behind incorrect classifications, and proposed their
own solutions to the problem. LIME presented a generalized method suitable for
both image and non-image inputs that boils down to set theory: if part of the
input were masked, would the overall classification get better or worse? By noting
which parts of the input make the most significant difference, the LIME algorithm
derives a linear classifier which approximates the non-linear NN, and the linear,
approximating classifier is then used to produce a mask for the input that high-
lights salient regions [54]. On the other hand, the Grad-CAM algorithm harnesses
backpropagation directly to derive an expression for localizing the most salient re-
gions [58]. Its innovation came from measuring image region contribution at a layer
closer to the classifying end of the NN than the input. Both of these ultimately
used linear techniques to describe a non-linear NN.
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While these methods produced reasonable explanations for the examples pro-
vided in their papers [54, 58], these methods provide little to no guarantee about
their validity. To evaluate their validity, we considered the relation between expla-
nations and adversarial examples: if a method explaining an NN’s decision were
accurate, then an adversarial example should primarily change the regions of the
image marked salient by the explainer.
Consider the lung nodule dataset published by the Japanese Society of Radio-
logical Technology (JSRT). This dataset consists of 247 chest X-rays, 154 of which
have a single, annotated nodule, each of which show up as dark, solitary shad-
ows. Chest X-rays are notoriously difficult to read, and so the JSRT dataset is
evaluated by nominating 5 candidate points which might be proximal to a tumor.
An algorithm’s output is considered correct if a tumor center is within 2.5 cm,
or 143 px, of any such candidate point. Scores are thus presented as sensitivity
given at most 5 false positives per X-ray. We trained a network on this problem
which scored 66% sensitivity by this rubric and applied LIME and Grad-CAM
to the NN, yielding Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 4.4 respectively. Considering the output of
LIME for this classifier, Fig. 4.3, we see that the produced explanation neither
makes intuitive sense nor instills confidence in the classifier. For the same net-
work, Grad-CAM produces a smoother, more intuitive explanation (Fig. 4.4). One
could reasonably infer from this explanation that the network is paying attention
to the high-contrast borders of the nodule, a reasonable approach for the problem.
However, this human-oriented interpretation of Grad-CAM’s output would be very
inaccurate; when compared with the adversarial example generated for the same
NN in Fig. 4.5, there is no correlation in overlap between the adversarial pertur-
bations and the salient region demarked by Grad-CAM. As such, it is hard to
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.3: A demonstration of LIME on an NN diagnosing lung nodules in the JSRT dataset.
LIME’s algorithm consists of taking an input (a), dividing it up into super-pixels (b), and then
using linear approximations to determine which subset of super-pixels most significantly affects
the network’s classification (c). How well does this explain the decision?
confidently state that the explanations yielded by LIME or Grad-CAM represent
dominant factors contributing to the NN’s output.
Attention models involve modifying the NN’s architecture to both enhance
overall NN performance and provide an attention mask which may be viewed as
an explanation mechanism [12, 64]. Where saliency maps demonstrate the most-
used pixels, attention models use a gating technique which involves multiplying
the inputs by a learned mask to shape how inputs are forwarded to the classifying
portion of the network. Viewing the mask of the attention model shows which
inputs were weighted more heavily for a given input. However, attention models
are still vulnerable to adversarial attacks which exploit only a small portion of the
masked region.
Also noteworthy is Bau et al.’s “Network Dissection” work [4]. By cross-
referencing the activation map of convolutional neurons in an NN with object
annotations, an IoU was computed on a per-neuron basis. They reasoned that
neurons relating to objects via a large IoU were responsible for detecting that
type of object or texture. However, the reported IoUs are quite small, with the
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Figure 4.4: Selvaraju et al.’s Grad-CAM [58] processes an input (a) and uses back-propagation
(b) to produce localized gradient information which can be presented as a heat map of salient
regions (c). How well does this explain the decision?
majority of reported values being below 0.2—higher than coincidence, but lower
than an authoritative explanation would merit. Bau et al. also made no mention
of how adversarial examples relate to their work. The approach is worth continued
research, but is not yet an end-all means of explaining NNs. More recently, Bau
et al. have applied their dissection methods to Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs), and demonstrated that omitting neurons with high IoUs in GANs can
predictably modify the generated images [5]. Nonetheless, that is a generative,
rather than explanatory, function.
4.1.3 Human-in-the-Loop (HITL)
While heat maps and regions of interest are poor indicators of a robust explanation,
they are not wholly irrelevant. Li et al.’s “Tell Me Where To Look” [35] demon-
strates the merit of using annotated salient regions—a straightforward method
of providing HITL functionality—as part of weakly-supervised training for NNs.
They introduced an algorithm which extends Grad-CAM’s heat map to be differ-
entiable, and then used gradient descent so that the highlighted region approaches
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0.97 non-nodule
(a)
= 0.96 nodule
(b)
+ noise ×2.1e− 03
(RMSE 0.0014)
(c)
Figure 4.5: An adversarial example corresponding to the same network and input as Figs. 4.3
and 4.4. Here, the resulting adversarial input (a) is the sum of the original input (b) and a
crafted noise term scaled by a small coefficient (c). The result is an imperceptible change in
input leading to a completely different NN output. Also worth noting is that the location of the
noise in (c) does not correlate well with either the LIME or Grad-CAM explanations.
that of annotated segmentations on a classification dataset. This method could
be considered a proof-of-concept for HITL applications based on NN explanations,
where each new human annotation ultimately becomes part of the training set for
the algorithm. For segmentation, their algorithm resulted in an impressive leap
from a mean Intersection-over-Union (IoU) of 0.555 with prior methods to 0.621
with theirs [35]. Additionally, for 10,000 classification training examples, they
only used segmentation masks for 1,464 of the examples [35], illustrating that even
partial annotations provided some benefit.
Ribeiro et al. [54] also used LIME in a HITL context by providing operators,
who were unfamiliar with machine learning, explanations on how a classifier got
to a decision. They first created classifiers that identified whether the topic from a
text document was ”Atheism” or ”Christianity,” from a dataset of 20 newsgroups.
Explanations were created based on which words led to the classifier’s answer via
LIME and these explanations were shown to crowdsourced human operators via
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Amazon Mechanical Turk to mark words that seemed irrelevant to the task. Two
algorithms were used to pick words to show to the operators: explanations ran-
domly picked and explanations deemed important via LIME. The classifier was
then retrained with the features deemed by operators to be irrelevant removed,
and the improved classifier was once again sent to human operators for additional
word removal. The real world accuracy of the classifier improved from a baseline of
approximately 57.4 % to approximately 69.7 % with randomly picked explanations
shown to the operators and approximately 73.2 % using explanations deemed im-
portant after 3 rounds of interaction. Importantly, this experiment demonstrated
that HITL processes could be used to significantly improve classifiers after few
iterations.
We explored an alternative HITL pipeline to improve the adversarial resis-
tance within an NN, instead of improving accuracy. Our process is outlined in
Section 4.2.8.
4.1.4 Lipschitz Continuity
Prior work has been performed on Lipschitz continuity, particularly with analyzing
the stability of NNs [6,66]. Briefly, Lipschitz continuity is the bounding of a func-
tion’s value, such that the function’s value is not allowed to change between two
points more than a constant value times the distance between those points. This is
often approximated as a bounding of the derivative. We differ from prior work in
this area as we consider the entirety of the NN as subject to Lipschitz constraints,
rather than each layer, and demonstrate this technique as providing viable resis-
tance against adversarial examples. We also propose several other modifications
to NNs, which complement enforcing Lipschitz continuity.
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4.2 Methods
Adversarial examples in state-of-the-art networks, as in Fig. 4.5, do little to illus-
trate the inner workings of the NN for which they are generated. However, the
potential exists for adversarial examples to be a very powerful, non-linear method
of explanation. Tsipras et al. [63] demonstrated that non-minimal adversarial ex-
amples contained salient features when networks were adversarially trained. Here,
non-minimal means adversarial examples which have not been optimized for min-
imal perturbation distance, but only for maximal loss on the objective function.
The current work considers whether decision boundaries may be pushed out even
further, such that minimal adversarial examples at class boundaries might demon-
strate the removal of features salient to the original classification. While previous
methods of explaining NNs rely on linearization techniques, adversarial examples
make full use of the NN’s non-linearities. With targeted attacks, the boundary
located could signify different salient aspects of the input stimulus, as in Fig. 4.1,
if the decision manifold of the network were sufficiently congruent with the visual
manifold. A practical demonstration of this theory may be seen through exam-
ples on the JSRT dataset in Figs. 4.6 and 4.7; these were implemented using the
techniques described throughout this section.
We will first discuss our method of generating adversarial attacks in Sec-
tion 4.2.1. Following that, the methods used to train robust NNs may be found in
Sections 4.2.2 to 4.2.8, and finally a discussion of the datasets used in this work
and the NN architectures chosen for those datasets is found in Section 4.2.9.
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0.75 non-nodule
(a)
= 0.66 nodule
(b)
+ noise ×6.9e− 03
(RMSE 0.0103)
(c)
Figure 4.6: In contrast to Fig. 4.5, our preliminary technique of increasing adversarial distance
concentrates the perturbations needed to change the network’s output. The RMSE (c) between
the original input (a) and the adversarial attack (b) is also much greater for a smaller change in
network output.
4.2.1 Adversarial Attack Generation and Evaluation
Adversarial attacks were conducted with two separate goals within this paper: Sec-
tion 4.2.1.1 contains the methodology for adversarial attacks aimed at reducing the
classification accuracy of a network, and Section 4.2.1.2 contains the methodology
for adversarial attacks aimed at producing classification explanations.
4.2.1.1 Adversarial Attacks on Accuracy
Untargeted adversarial attack generation for the evaluation of models followed Al-
gorithm 1; this was a variant of Carlini et al. [10]. Rather than pursuing both
target loss maximization and L2 error minimization simultaneously, we found that
alternating between these two to traverse some restriction on the adversarial ex-
ample’s network output allowed for better automatic balancing between the two
errors, resulting in smaller perturbation magnitudes. In contrast to the attacks
presented by Carlini et al. [10], the algorithm presented will not begin a magni-
tude refinement before the target classification error is reached. The threshold at
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(c)
Figure 4.7: Example of emphasizing a lung nodule via the same method of adversarial attack.
Same network as Fig. 4.6.
which Algorithm 1 switches between minimizing the correct class’ post-softmax
prediction st and minimizing the attack magnitude is defined by g(s, t).
We present two choices of g(s, t) for the current work. The first, gadv(s, t), was
the well-known adversarial attack metric used by all prior work in this field [11,63],
and denotes the boundary at which top-1 accuracy would decrease:
gadv(s, t) =

1 if st −maxj(sj; j 6= t) < 0,
0 otherwise.
(4.2)
This was the g(s, t) used to produce Fig. 4.2. When ARA values are reported
for a model, we evaluated random validation or testing images until we had 1,000
which were correctly classified. We then made a list of the RMSEs below which each
image would retain the correct classification, minimized as per Algorithm 1. This
list was extended with 0s for each image evaluated which was initially incorrectly
classified: if a model scored 70 % classification accuracy on unmodified images,
we would have a final RMSE list of about 1,429 in length, 1,000 of which were
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Algorithm 1: Process used to generate adversarial examples.
Input: N , the number of attack-optimizing steps; f(·), the NN; x, the network input;
t, the true class of the input; o(·), an optimizing method such as SGD with
momentum; g(s, t), a goal function returning true if the network outputs from
the attack are suitably different from the true class t; η, a balancing term
between categorical loss and MSE loss.
Output: δbest, the adversarial noise which satisfies the goal g(·) and has minimal
vector length.
1 begin
2 δ ← ~0
3 Mbest ← inf
4 for n ∈ [0, ..., N − 1] do
5 x̂← c(x+ δ) // c(·) clips elements of its argument to a valid
input range, e.g. [0, 1]
6 y ← f(x̂)
7 s← softmax(y)
8 if g(s, t) then
9 ∆δ ← 2δ // L2 loss for magnitude
10 if ||δ||2 < Mbest then
11 Mbest ← ||δ||2
12 δbest ← δ
13 else
14 ∆δ ← ∂st/∂(x+ δ)
15 ∆δ ← η ∆δ||∆δ||2 // Fixed gradient magnitude
16 δ ← o(δ,∆δ) // Apply optimizer step
non-zero. This list was then evaluated for accuracy at different levels of RMSE, as
seen in Fig. 4.2, and the area above the naive baseline was taken to produce the
attack ARA metric.
In the context of Algorithm 1, we used N = 450, o(·) was a Stochastic Gradient
Descent (SGD) optimizer with a learning rate of 0.01 and momentum 0.9, and
η = 0.55. Examples of our attack against a regular JSRT network can be seen in
Fig. 4.5, and against a regular CIFAR-10 ResNet-44 network in Fig. 4.13.
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4.2.1.2 Adversarial Attacks as Explanations
In the context of explanations, however, we found the gadv(s, t) metric to be lacking.
For example, consider two closely related classes from CIFAR-10: automobile and
truck. These classes are often confused for one another, leading to a decrease in
the magnitude of untargeted attacks for members of either class. With respect to
the network’s ability to tell these two apart, gadv remains a good metric. However,
as a classifier learns to distinguish these related classes from the other unrelated
classes, the sj corresponding to these related classes might rise in tandem. The
described phenomenon is illustrated in Fig. 4.8. This situation would indicate
that the network possesses a greater capacity for deciding what is “automobile” or
“truck” compared to the remaining classes, but the attack magnitude would not
decrease as these two classes would still be easily confused. Since the confusion
between these two classes is built into the problem, gadv hits a ceiling beyond
which an attack magnitude based on the gadv metric cannot be improved. As such,
we also considered Better Than Random (BTR) as a measure of the classifier’s
knowledge of class-specific features. The BTR magnitudes were defined based on
the distance between the classifier’s prediction and a prediction at which the true
label’s valuation matches that of a random classifier. As shown in Fig. 4.8, the BTR
quantity continues to increase even as related classes both become more confident
predictions. Thus, gbtr (where V is the number of classes in the prediction) is
defined as:
gbtr(s, t) =

1 if st <
1
V
,
0 otherwise.
(4.3)
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Figure 4.8: The previously mentioned attack ARA metric depends on the relative confidence
between the correct class and the second-most-confident class. For related classes such as “car”
and “truck,” the distance between these two classes may not increase through training. However,
by measuring the distance from the correct class back to a fixed baseline, as is done with the BTR
ARA metric, improvements in feature recognition may be measured regardless of the presence of
related classes.
We note that the numerical stability of BTR is guaranteed as resetting all
pre-softmax outputs to 0 achieves the required condition. Note also that we delib-
erately chose a truly random classifier, and not a naive classifier, for unbalanced
datasets. When calculating BTR ARA metrics from a population of adversarial
examples created using gbtr, a naive classifier was still used as the baseline for the
area calculation.
For actually generating explanations, it was most useful to follow ∂st/∂(x+ δ)
up to a boundary RMSE, at which point RMSE would be minimized, a tick-
tock method similar to Algorithm 1, but substituting a slightly different boundary
criteria:
gexplain+(δ; ρ) =

1 if ||δ|| > ρ,
0 otherwise.
(4.4)
We note that gexplain− is also possible, by modifying Algorithm 1 to maximize
67
donut 0.14
sandwich 0.09
(a) Original
donut 0.84
...sandwich 0.01
(b) Donut gexplain+
fire hydrant 0.97
...sandwich 0.00
(c) Donut gexplain−
sandwich 0.47
hot dog 0.11
(d) Sandwich gexplain+
sports ball 1.00
...sandwich 0.00
(e) Sandwich gexplain−
horse 0.36
...sandwich 0.01
(f) Horse gexplain+
Figure 4.9: Different explanation techniques using ρ = 0.075. (a) The original image. (b) A
positive explanation for the donut class; we note alignment of the added “hole” with a wrinkle
in the original sandwich bun. (c) A negative explanation for the donus class resulted in the
removal of the round shape of the sandwich. (d) A positive explanation for the true class,
sandwich, results in exposed contents (peppers or tomatoes), and the beginnings of lettuce. (e)
A negative explanation for the sandwich class reveals homogenization of the bun’s texture, and
further rounding out of the overall shape. (f) Positive explanation for a completely unrelated
class, horse; legs were clearly added, and the textured area in the upper-left of the image is
appropriated as a saddle.
the selected class loss rather than minimizing it. These techniques are demon-
strated in Fig. 4.9.
4.2.1.3 Example ARA Metrics
For a traditional ImageNet ResNet-18, we measured an attack ARA of 0.0004 and
a BTR ARA of 0.0013. For a CIFAR-10 ResNet-44, we measured an attack ARA
of 0.0013 and a BTR ARA of 0.0014. Further discussion of these metrics in the
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context of adversarial examples may be found in Section 4.3.1.
4.2.2 Defense via Lipschitz Continuity
An integral part of many white-box attacks, including Algorithm 1, involves fol-
lowing the gradient of some loss. The rate at which the output of the network
might be changed is likewise dependent on that gradient. To see how this might
affect classification networks, consider the softmax operation, here denoted as s(·),
applied to the output of an NN, y:
s(y) =
ey∑V
i=1 e
yi
. (4.5)
In the 1,000-class ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Competition 2012
(ILSVRC 2012) challenge, there are 1,000 classes [56]. Assuming 999 of those
classes have an NN output of yi = 0, then a value for the remaining class of
yj = 10 corresponds to a confidence in class j of 95.7 %. For a confidence of 4.3 %,
that value need only fall to yj = 3.8. In reality, an adversarial attack also has the
option of increasing the confidence of classes i 6= j to reduce confidence of class j.
If yj = 3.8, and another yk = 6.2, k 6= j, then the confidence of class j falls to 2.9 %
and class k skyrockets to 32.1 %. In other words, instability on the output values
will quickly overwhelm the softmax operation. If we assume locally-linear behavior
of the network, this instability may be modeled by looking at the expected change
in the network’s output given some gradient information. Using Ei [·] to denote an
expectation conditioned on i, N as the number of input elements, ∆ to signify an
actual value change, and ∂ to signify a variable’s partial:
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Ei [|∆yi|] ≈ Ei
[∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
j=1
∆xj
∂yi
∂xj
∣∣∣∣∣
]
, (4.6)
/
N∑
j=1
Ei,j
[∣∣∣∣∆xj ∂yi∂xj
∣∣∣∣] , (4.7)
These quantities are neither independent nor equivalent,
but we will simplify them as such:
E [|∆yi|] / NE [|∆xj|]E
[∣∣∣∣ ∂yi∂xj
∣∣∣∣] . (4.8)
Equation (4.8) provides a loose guideline for targeting different values of |∂yi/∂x|.
In fact, as a network becomes more non-linear, Eq. (4.8) becomes less accurate.
To see how effective the guideline given by Eq. (4.8) was in practice, we built a
ResNet-18 and trained it on ILSVRC 2012 training data, detailed in Section 4.2.9.2.
Leveraging PyTorch’s automated differential engine, we collected gradients for one
of the NN’s outputs, before the softmax, with respect to each of the 150,528 input
elements (224 · 224 · 3). The mean absolute value of the computed derivatives then
resulted in an aggregate number which summarized the network’s volatility in the
original input space. For our ResNet-18, this value worked out to 0.051 /input.
Interestingly, the mean of the maximum absolute derivative per image was a much
larger 3.9 /input, indicating a large spread in these values. Attacks were generated
against this network with a 50 % confidence margin in favor of an adversarial class.
Again, based on a local-linearity assumption, the magnitudes of these attacks
were measured as the mean absolute difference per pixel between the original and
attacked images. The harmonic mean of the mean absolute distances of all such
attacks against this network was found to be 0.0033 /input; according to Eq. (4.8),
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the sum of ∆yi between the true and adversarially targeted classes should then be
less than 50.7. The actual measured sum of ∆yi across the true and target classes
averaged 26.1.
The change in network output was shown in Eq. (4.8) to be bounded propor-
tionally to the gradient of the output with respect to each input element, as long
as local network behavior was linear. Since this assumption seemed to hold for real
networks, we theorized that limiting this gradient would therefore provide some
adversarial resistance in these linear regions of the network by forcing additional
non-linearities to compensate for the limitation. This is a form of Lipschitz conti-
nuity, as discussed in Section 4.1.4. From another point of view, limiting |∂yi/∂xj|
makes each training element a stable point for the network, enforcing a neighbor-
hood of validity for each decision. The classification loss then enforces necessary
non-linearities between these stable regions. As such, this work’s primary con-
tribution is to explore the relation between limiting E[|∂yi/∂xj|] and adversarial
attacks. In the context of Eq. (4.1), this moves the focus from attempting to solve
the outer minimization equation directly to instead limiting the effects of travel-
ing in the allowed attack space S. We note that, particularly with the Rectified
Linear Unit (ReLU) activation function, even a gradient of ~0 does not guarantee
a neighborhood of validity; see Section 4.2.7 concerning that issue.
For networks with 1,000 outputs, minimizing |∂yi/∂xj| directly for all i is com-
putationally prohibitive - each training image processed would require 1,000 addi-
tional gradient propagations. Instead, we use a regularizing loss which is stochas-
tically defined with a scaling parameter ψ and a power factor z:
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vk ∼ [1, 2, ..., V ],
Ladv,z =
ψ
KN
K∑
k=1
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∂yvk∂xj
∣∣∣∣z . (4.9)
Equation (4.9) therefore draws K random indices (without replacement) from
the available output nodes and minimizes the derivative of each selected output
with respect to all inputs. Backpropagation makes this an efficient computation
regardless of the number of input elements. When K = V , Ladv,z ceases to be
stochastic. K and N are both included in the denominator such that the expected
force per image relative to the classification loss is maintained regardless of the
number of inputs or outputs. Sections 4.3.1.2 and 4.3.1.3 demonstrates the effects
both of the relative strength of this loss, through changing ψ, and by varying its
stochasticity, through changing K.
In addition to investigating the absolute value form of Eq. (4.9), using |∂ynk/∂xj|z,
we investigated instead minimizing Ladv,z,q =
(∑N
l=1 |∂ynk/∂xl|
)q
|∂ynk/∂xj|z for
some values of z and q. We included these to illustrate that the proposed regu-
larization technique is in fact a rich family of techniques based on approximations
of which quantities are relevant for adversarial defense; a limited investigation of
these metaparameters is found in Section 4.3.1.13. From this point forward we will
use Ladv to refer to any of these, with default values of z = 2 and q = 0 unless
otherwise specified.
We also considered the effects of creating a “dead zone” where gradients would
not be punished, like a true Lipschitz constraint. For these experiments, instead
of minimizing based on |∂ynk/∂xj| directly, Ladv would be minimized based on
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max(|∂ynk/∂xj| − δ, 0). Results are found in Section 4.3.1.6.
It is also possible for nk to be drawn from a non-uniform distribution. To test
the merits of this, we considered distributions which yielded the correct label ζ% of
the time and were pulled from a random distribution (including the correct label)
the rest of the time. Results with this technique are discussed in Sections 4.3.1.8
and 4.3.1.14.
Another variant of non-uniform distribution involved substituting the mini-
mization of the true class’ gradient ζ% of the time for minimizing the gradient
(∂yt − maxi 6=t∂yi)/∂xj, the difference between the true class and the maximum
non-true class prediction. This regularization, which we label Ladv,tandem because
it aligns the gradients of two different classes in tandem, was chosen based on the
“automobile” vs “truck” discussion from Section 4.2.1.2. While regularizing only
one class at a time guarantees that the gradient for that class will approach zero,
this provides an opportunity for a related class to dominate. Since the softmax
operation assigns probabilities based on the difference between elements of its in-
put, it was determined that it might be more effective to regularize the difference
between those inputs (the NN’s output). Results for this technique are presented
in Section 4.3.1.14.
4.2.3 Gradient Minimization as Weight Regularization
Exploring analogs to minimizing |∂yi/∂xj| further, consider a single layer of an
NN:
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~y = f(A~x+~b),
∂~y
∂~x
=
∂f(·)
∂·
A. (4.10)
Assuming all paths are active and we’re using a ReLU network, then ∂f(·)/∂· =
1. Since we would then use the element-wise absolute value or square of each
element of A to devise our adversarial loss function Ladv, this is identical to L1 or
L2 regularization for q = 0, z ∈ {1, 2}. While in a multi-layer setup, the proposed
Ladv diverges from standard weight regularization, we considered it worthwhile to
run experiments with weight regularization disabled on the convolutional weights in
the network (keeping it enabled on biases within the network). These are explored
in Section 4.3.1.10.
4.2.4 Half-Huber Rectified Linear Unit (HHReLU)
A classical ReLU is continuous in value, but its derivative is discontinuous. Our
proposal required optimizing the derivative of the activation functions used by the
network, and as such we desired the first derivative to be continuous, allowing that
the second derivative might be discontinuous. Related to the Huber function, we
devised a new activation function, the Half-Huber ReLU (HHReLU), defined as:
f(x) =

0, x < 0,
dx2, x < 1
2d
x− 1
4d
, otherwise.
(4.11)
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While the parameter d describes the acceleration of the x2 region, for timely
results, we did not explore this parameter outside of d = 1. Nonetheless, we note
that other values of d or other activation functions with a continuous first deriva-
tive might be explored further in the future. The impact of using this activation
function instead of a traditional ReLU is explored in Section 4.3.1.7.
4.2.5 Output Zeroing
The softmax function, Eq. (4.5), is translation-invariant with respect to its inputs.
We found that, in practice, allowing networks to rely on the invariance of the
softmax function resulted in the flattening effects of Ladv persisting classification
errors within the network. For instance, assume a two-class NN, which is producing
output y0 = 1, y1 = 2 for some input. The adversarial resistance loss from Eq. (4.9)
induces a certain amount of inertia about y0 = 1, y1 = 2, making it harder for
the network to switch the ordering of these outputs. Adding an additional L2
regularization term for the pre-softmax output of the network biases all of these
terms toward 0, easing the classification task:
Lout = kout
∑
i
y2i . (4.12)
If kout is too large, then the network will never gain any confidence in its an-
swers. Too small a kout and the benefits will disappear. Therefore, similar to the
guidelines on |∂yi/∂xi| established by Eq. (4.8), we provide some guideline calcu-
lations regarding the balancing of these two forces while considering the maximum
learnable confidence when training with a cross-entropy loss L(·) (using V as the
number of possible classes):
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Assume yz = 0, where z 6= t,
L(~y) = −log(st), si =
eyi
eyi + V − 1
,
dL/dyt = st − 1. (4.13)
When the network’s predictions are an accurate distribution, and examples are
uniformly distributed, yi only has a 1/V chance of being a large value and needing
to contest the classification loss. The rest of the time, it would only have a 1− si
chance of being large for a confusing example. Balancing the force of the cross-
entropy loss, L(·), with Lout yields:
L
V
=
Lout
V
+
(V − 1)(1− st)Lout
V
,
1− st
V
=
kout2yt
V
+
(V − 1)(1− st)kout2yt
V
,
kout =
1− st
2yt(1 + (V − 1)(1− st))
. (4.14)
Equation (4.14), like Eq. (4.8), is not claimed to be an exact equation. However,
it gives a guideline for reasonable parameter values. We tried st = 0.8 for all
experiments, yielding kout = 0.01 for our CIFAR-10 experiments, kout = 6e− 5 for
our ImageNet experiments, and kout = 1e− 3 for our COCO experiments. Results
of varying this parameter on the CIFAR-10 dataset may be found in Section 4.3.1.9.
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4.2.6 Adaptive ψ
To ease comparisons between the meta-parameters necessary for our proposed
technique to work, we investigated setting ψ from Eq. (4.9) automatically based on
a targeted training loss. We performed experiments using an integrating controller:
ψ = kψ,0e
kψ
∑
b c ln(Ltrain,b/Ltarget), (4.15)
c(d) = clip(d,−εworse, εbetter),
where b is the batch index, Ltarget is the targeted training loss, and Ltrain,b is the
training loss for batch b. While this approach still has one significant metaparame-
ter, Ltarget, the meaning of its value is consistent regardless of other parameters. In
all experiments, the regularization proposed in this work was capable of matching
Ltarget. Note that the strength of ψ is based on the exponential of the integral
as we found this to work significantly better across different scales of Ltarget, and
throughout network training. The inner summation of Eq. (4.15) was always pre-
vented from falling below zero, making kψ,0 the minimum strength.
Values used were typically kψ,0 = 220, kψ = 0.02, εbetter = 1, εworse = 0.01,
though early experiments used kψ,0 = 0.01, εworse = 1 (experiments before those
discussed in Section 4.3.1.14).
4.2.7 Adversarial and Noisy Training
Section 4.2.2 mentioned that, even with gradients of ~0 at all points in the training
data, an activation function like ReLU guarantees no neighborhood for which the
gradient will remain ~0. That is, a loss “cliff” might be arbitrarily close to any
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Figure 4.10: Training an NN on samples from a dataset (left) specify desired behavior at the data
points, but does not describe behavior in between those data points, allowing the decision surface
to take an arbitrary shape. Adding some noise (second from left) can somewhat improve the
behavior between dataset samples, but is statistically unlikely to improve the worst behaviors.
Adversarial training (second from right) deliberately attempts to improve the worst performing
points, leading to a smoother decision surface. Adding a stochastic Lipschitz loss, as Eq. (4.9),
further smooths behavior between data points.
training point. This is partly due to natural training overfitting, illustrated in
Fig. 4.10. As such, we also investigated combining our method with either random
Gaussian noise or adversarial training.
Adversarial training was implemented two ways. In the first way, denoted as
L2, an L2 distance ε was chosen and the adversary attempted to find the highest
loss value within that ε-ball. The gradient of the classification cross-entropy loss
was followed for 7 steps, each time being normalized to ε/7 magnitude. In the
second way, minimal adversarial training denoted as L2,min, an L2 distance ε was
also chosen, but before taking each step, the network’s classification was evaluated.
If the network correctly classified the example, then the gradient of classification
loss was normalized to length ψ7,nε and followed, where ψk,n = 2(k− n)/[k(k+ 1)]
and n ∈ [0, 1, ..., k−1] is the index of the step being taken. In this formulation, the
step sizes at subsequent steps yield progressively finer movements. If the network
incorrectly classified the example, then the gradient was replaced with the negation
of the current perturbation, normalized to size ψ7,nε, and followed. That is, the
L2,min method of adversarial training sought to train on adversarial examples near
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the boundary at which the network would misclassify those examples.
Training configurations where batches were composed of half adversarial exam-
ples and half original examples from the dataset were also considered. In Tsipras
et al. [63], this technique was called “Half-Half” training, and we keep that nomen-
clature.
Neither of these guarantee that a loss cliff would be corrected, but as seen in
Section 4.3.1.15, they both somewhat alleviate the underlying problem. We also
note that noise from batch normalization and data augmentation should help with
this problem.
4.2.8 Human-in-the-Loop (HITL)
We explored using the adversarial examples generated from our networks to boot-
strap even better adversarial resistance in a HITL pipeline with a User Interface
(UI) as shown in Fig. 4.11. The UI took a trained network and used it to generate
high-confidence adversarial examples. These examples were also generated from
Algorithm 1, but instead with a high-confidence condition of g(s, t) = maxj(sj; j 6=
t)−maxq(sq; q 6= j) > 0.5. That is, the adversarially generated, incorrect class had
to be 50 % more confident than the next-highest class. Users were then presented
with three options: unchanged, unsure, and no longer the original class. When any
button was pressed, the adversarial image was saved along with the original label
and the annotation. We then tested re-training networks from scratch using the
adversarial images annotated as “unchanged” as part of the training data. While
this method of feedback was somewhat limited, we offer it as a proof-of-concept
that our method of producing adversarial explanations could be used not only to
inform the user about the reasoning behind an algorithmic decision, but also to
79
Figure 4.11: Prototype HITL interface. Whereas adversarial training simply generates adversarial
examples and trains them to be recognized as the original class, our adversarial examples can
be made of sufficient quality to merit human intervention as to whether or not the class of the
image has changed.
feed HITL annotations back into improving the classifier.
4.2.9 Architectures and Datasets
This section contains details on the architectures used for the various datasets
discussed in this document.
4.2.9.1 CIFAR-10
CIFAR-10 is a commonly-used dataset with 50,000 training images and 10,000
test images, consisting of 32× 32 RGB images belonging to one of 10 classes [31].
Our CIFAR-10 experiments were based on a ResNet-44 [16], modified to be in
pre-activation form [17] with each residual block’s output convolution weights ini-
tialized to zero as per [18]. Training used mini-batches of size 256 spread across
2 GPUs, for 128 images per GPU. We used standard data augmentation tech-
niques for this task, reflecting the bordering 4 pixels and taking a random 32× 32
crop during training. Training images were horizontally flipped 50 % of the time.
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Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) was used to optimize weights with a momen-
tum of 0.9 and L2 weight regularization with a strength of 1e − 4, starting at a
learning rate of 0.02 which was linearly increased to 0.2 over the first 10 epochs.
The learning rate was then stepped down to 0.02 and 0.002 at 170 and 195 epochs,
respectively. Training was halted at 200 epochs. This entire setup was imple-
mented in PyTorch [49], and resulted in a final top-1 validation accuracy of 92.2 %
on a network without other changes.
4.2.9.2 ILSVRC 2012
While CIFAR-10 is small enough to iterate on quickly, success on CIFAR-10 does
not guarantee the generality of a technique. Therefore, we also investigated train-
ing on the ILSVRC 2012 dataset, consisting of 1,281,167 training and 50,000 valida-
tion RGB images of varying size but significantly higher resolution than CIFAR-10,
with objects belonging to one of 1,000 classes [56]. We trained a ResNet-18 [16]
modified to be in pre-activation form [17] with each residual block’s output convo-
lution weights initialized to zero as per [18]. To ease gradient descent with respect
to the input as discussed in Section 4.2.2, we also replaced the initial max pooling
operation with an average pooling operation. L2 regularization was applied to
weights and biases with a strength of 1e-4 . Training used mini-batches of size 192
spread across 3 GPUs, for 64 images per GPU. We used standard data augmenta-
tion techniques for this task, resizing the smallest edge of each image in [256, 480]
and taking a random 224× 224 crop. Each crop was then given a 50 % chance of
being horizontally flipped. We skipped the standard color augmentations. Rather
than using the state-of-the-art method of computing validation accuracy, which
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would have involved a 10-crop on the validation phase [16], we instead resized im-
ages such that the smallest edge was 256 pixels across and then took a crop of the
central 224× 224 pixels for validation. SGD was used to optimize weights with a
momentum of 0.9 and L2 weight regularization with a strength of 1e− 4, starting
at a learning rate of 0.03 and linearly increased to 0.3 over the first 10 epochs.
The learning rate was then stepped down to 0.03 and 0.003 at 50 and 60 epochs,
respectively. Training was halted at 65 epochs. This entire setup was implemented
in PyTorch [49], and resulted in a final top-1 validation accuracy of 65.6 % on a
network without other changes.
4.2.9.3 Microsoft COCO
The Common Objects in COntext (COCO) dataset [37] was used as an additional
proof-of-concept. The dataset consists of images containing scenes of multiple
annotated objects from 80 different classes. To stick to classification problems for
demonstrating our methods, we created a sub-dataset from COCO which consisted
of taking the bounding box of each annotated object as a separate input example.
During training, each object’s sub-image was resized such that the smallest edge
was between 96 and 120 pixels long, selected a random 96×96 crop, and randomly
performed a horizontal flip. During validation, each object was resized such that
the smallest edge was 108 pixels long, and then the central crop of 96× 96 pixels
was selected. This scheme often led to images that overlap with the “person”
classification, but was sufficient as a proof-of-concept.
The base network used for COCO annotations was the same ResNet-44 network
from Section 4.2.9.1 as used CIFAR-10, but with filters of size 32, 64, and 128 (twice
the standard width). Rather than the standard convolution for transforming input
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data for the first residual block, we used a convolutional layer with a kernel size of
4 and a stride of 3, which reduced the image from 96×96 to 32×32. SGD was used
with a momentum of 0.9 and L2 weight regularization with a strength of 1e − 4,
starting at a learning rate of 0.02 which was linearly increased to 0.2 over the first
10 epochs. The learning rate was then stepped down to 0.02 and 0.002 at 55 and
70 epochs, respectively. Training was halted at 80 epochs. This entire setup was
implemented in PyTorch [49], and resulted in a final top-1 validation accuracy of
77.4 % on a network without other changes. We note that this accuracy did not
take class imbalances into account. For example, the greatest imbalance in our
validation dataset was for the class “person,” which accounted for 31.4 % of all
objects in the dataset.
4.2.9.4 JSRT
The JSRT is described in Section 4.1.2. Our JSRT results were produced with
networks similar to the ResNet-44 networks for CIFAR-10 from Section 4.2.9.1,
using filters of size 64, 96, and 128, and with an initial convolution of kernel size 9
followed by an average pooling layer of size 8. Additionally, each input image was
normalized such that it had zero-mean and unit variance; this was done due to wild
variations in the different scans and scanned regions. Regions of 256× 256 pixels
were selected either A) with the central point being part of the nodule annotation
for images containing nodules, or B) entirely randomly for images not containing
nodules. Malignant and benign classifications were considered the same, under a
new “nodule” category (making the problem binary). Training images were heavily
augmented with shear angles from [−30, 30] degrees, rotated from [−45, 45] degrees,
and scaled on a factor of [0.61, 1.65]. Additionally, random square regions of the
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final training image between [0, 64] pixels on each side were set to either black or
white, to augment against the earlier per-image normalization.
4.2.10 Code Availability
A reference implementation of the techniques presented throughout this section
applied to the CIFAR-10 dataset may be found at https://github.com/
wwoods/adversarial-explanations-cifar.
4.3 Results
The majority of our experiments were conducted on CIFAR-10 due to it being a
smaller dataset which was faster for iterating parameters and ideas. These are
explored in Section 4.3.1. Experiments on ILSVRC 2012 were also conducted, and
are covered in Section 4.3.2. Experiments on the COCO dataset are covered in
Section 4.3.3.
4.3.1 CIFAR-10 Experiments
All CIFAR-10 experiments run with a ResNet-44 have been plotted in Fig. 4.12.
At each level of accuracy (x axis), there may be several dots for ARA (y axis),
indicating separate experiments with different levels of adversarial resistance. The
variance of individual experiments is indicated in Section 4.3.1.3. The most imme-
diate quality to be seen comparing best-in-class RMSEs across different accuracies
is that accuracy may be sacrificed for additional adversarial resistance.
Large, colored dots indicate selected experiments. • N1 indicates a traditional
ResNet-44, not modified for increased resistance. • N2 indicates a traditional
ResNet-44 trained with adversarial training alone. • N3 indicates a ResNet-44
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with the modifications from Section 4.2, and was trained with both adversar-
ial training and Ltarget = 1.5. • N4 indicates a similar ResNet-44 to N3, but
without the adversarial training. A comparison of adversarial attacks against the
networks indicated by colored dots may be found in Fig. 4.13. The adversarial
attacks against even the most robust of the networks were still very small pertur-
bations, but did result in the visible accentuation of certain features, particularly
the car door. An ideal network would produce genuine ambiguity at the adver-
sarial example boundary. However, the right side of this figure demonstrates the
proposed explanation techniques applied to the different networks. Each of the
gexplain columns were produced with an RMSE of 0.15; N1’s modifications look
like static, and while the example for the adversarially trained N2 is beginning
to exhibit salient features, there is little difference between the “car” and “cat”
columns. In contrast, N3 and N4 both demonstrate clear features, illustrating the
utility of our stochastic Lipschitz regularization for producing networks capable of
generating coherent explanations.
See Appendix A.1 for more examples of adversarial attacks against our CIFAR-
10 networks. We emphasize that adversarial attacks against networks using our
regularization term demonstrated increasingly salient features from the targeted
class as the BTR ARA metric increased. These salient features were not forced
from any term which necessitated a reconstruction of the input, as one would see
with a GAN or Variational Autoencoder, indicating that the proposed technique
alone was sufficient for producing classifiers which rely on salient features.
The most important CIFAR-10 experiments are detailed in Tables 4.1 to 4.4.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 address ablations of the techniques mentioned in Sections 4.2.2
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Figure 4.12: Plot of all CIFAR-10 experiments run with a ResNet-44; accuracy on clean data
versus attack ARA (as per Section 4.2.1). • N1 indicates an unmodified ResNet-44, • N2
indicates a network trained with only adversarial training, • N3 indicates a network which
combines adversarial training and our regularization, and • N4 indicates an experiment using
only our regularization. Dotted experiments are also used in Fig. 4.13.
to 4.2.5, showing that these techniques all work together to provide a reason-
able level of adversarial resistance. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 illustrates the merits of
Sections 4.2.6 to 4.2.8. The following sections share the same titles as the table
entries for easy cross-referencing. Where applicable, rows in the tables have the
same colored dots as Fig. 4.12, indicating the exact experiments conducted for
those results.
4.3.1.1 Traditional ResNet-44
Our baseline ResNet-44 result is denoted in the first row of both Tables 4.1 and 4.3.
The • dot in the row means that it corresponds to the experiment with the same
dot in Figs. 4.12 and 4.13. For this model, none of the adversarial explanations are
sensible to a human observer, yet result in a significant change in the network’s
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output (see Appendix A.1 for more examples).
4.3.1.2 Varied ψ from Eq. (4.9)
We sought to verify that increasing the strength of our proposed regularization
would lead to an increase in adversarial resistance. The first section of Table 4.1
demonstrated that this was the case, with the classifier’s attack and BTR ARAs
increasing monotonically with the strength of the regularization. Notable also is
that, up to a certain level of ψ = 4.0, we were able to maintain the classifier’s
accuracy on clean data while gaining additional adversarial resistance. After that,
clean accuracy decreased as adversarial resistance increased. Therefore, ψ may
be varied in accordance with which is more desirable: accuracy or adversarial
resistance.
We also note that the training accuracy never reached 100 % for these experi-
ments, indicating that a ResNet-44 does not have the ability to express a solution
to the classification problem which both optimizes accuracy and has derivatives
approximately equal to zero; this is explored further in Section 4.3.1.5.
4.3.1.3 Varying K from Eq. (4.9)
The stochastic formulation of Eq. (4.9) was expected to yield the same results as
a non-stochastic formulation. To check the validity of this assumption, we tried
different values of K, from 1 to 8. These experiments demonstrated that varying
K had little effect. As such, all subsequent experiments used K = 1, which is
more efficient to compute than any greater K as it only requires one additional
backpropagation per training batch.
As these experiments were virtually identical, they also demonstrated that
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training with the proposed regularization produced results with little variance.
4.3.1.4 Regularization methods
From the prior groups of experiments, it may be concluded that the adversarial
resistance loss proposed in Eq. (4.9) provided a useful form of regularization. We
wanted to test the combination of using Eq. (4.9) with other regularization tech-
niques. Due to their promising results on CIFAR-10, we investigated Stochastic
Depth [23] and ShakeDrop [74]. Our experiments with these showed that the pro-
posed regularization performed best on its own, with additional regularizations
resulting in lower accuracy on the clean data as well as when dealing with an ad-
versary. We note that, as our networks’ training accuracy on the final epoch were
never significantly higher than their validation accuracy, it is likely that a network
would need significantly higher capacity before additional regularization would be
useful.
4.3.1.5 Varied network depth/width
As mentioned in Sections 4.3.1.2 and 4.3.1.4, the training loss never approached
zero when using the proposed regularization. We assumed this was due to a lack of
model capacity. As such, we tried two different variations of the traditional ResNet,
each having roughly 4× as many parameters as the original network. ResNet-170
is four times as deep, and we also used a ResNet-44 with filters of size [32, 64, 128]
for each of the three residual blocks, rather than the traditional [16, 32, 64]. In-
terestingly, the ResNet-170 did not appear to have an easier time optimizing the
training accuracy. The double width ResNet-44, however, improved slightly in
both accuracy and adversarial resistance. As will be seen in Section 4.3.1.12, we
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found that another trick was required to fully utilize additional network capacity.
At this point, one can begin to see the difference between attack ARA and
BTR ARA. Though the ψ = 12, 000 used for these experiments resulted in an only
minor increase in attack ARA to 0.0110 from 0.0084 for ψ = 220, the BTR ARA
jumped from 0.0135 to 0.0347. This indicates that while the classifier was worse
at accurately identifying an object in a tiny image, it was better at recognizing
features of objects within the dataset. This manifested as clearer images - many
of the adversarial perturbations for ψ = 220 still looked like randomized noise,
whereas the adversarial perturbations for ψ = 12000 looked like deliberate changes
to the objects in the image.
4.3.1.6 “Dead zone” from Section 4.2.2
A true Lipschitz-enforcing loss would not require any penalty on derivatives inside
a region [−σ, σ]. These experiments demonstrated that increasing σ results in
higher accuracy but less adversarial resistance, particularly in the BTR category.
An additional experiment which used σ = 0 but set ψ such that the final accuracy is
about the same demonstrates that there seemed to be no benefit from the addition
of this metaparameter, and that leaving it at σ = 0 would seem to be the best
choice. Part of this was due to the difficulty of setting σ: different values of ψ
caused |∂ynk/∂xj| to be at different scales, and it was difficult to decide on a good
value of σ. As we will argue in Section 4.3.1.13, there is a better way to implement
a true Lipschitz constraint in Eq. (4.9), should it be beneficial.
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4.3.1.7 Half-Huber ReLU from Section 4.2.4
The experiments before this point have used a traditional ReLU; here we used the
HHReLU instead, which has a continuous derivative. At first glance the HHReLU
was a modest improvement: improved accuracy and attack ARA, but substantially
decreased BTR ARA. However, by training a ReLU network with an adjusted
ψ such that the accuracy was about the same as the HHReLU version of the
network, we saw that the HHReLU version of the network was better in both attack
and BTR ARAs. Thus, the HHReLU is an important part of our regularization
method, helping networks to learn better structural properties while retaining raw
classification accuracy.
We note another potential explanation for a smaller BTR ARA in the first
experiment with HHReLU: the HHReLU makes gradients that are easier to follow,
and consequently also eases the task of generating successful attacks. That is, the
BTR ARA metric for the ReLU network may be inflated as our adversary was
unable to find low-perturbation attacks due to the increased difficulty of following
gradients in a ReLU network.
4.3.1.8 Varied ζ from Section 4.2.2
These results demonstrated that ζ > 0 was capable of inducing better results on the
ARA metrics, but at a cost of some accuracy. We will revisit ζ in Section 4.3.1.14.
4.3.1.9 Output zeroing from Section 4.2.5
This segment of experiments contained two interesting outcomes. The first was
that biasing the pre-softmax part of the network toward zero via kout = 0.01 slightly
improved accuracy and slightly worsened adversarial resistance. The second was
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that doubling the number of epochs improved accuracy but worsened adversarial
resistance. This was likely due to adversarial overfitting: the E[|∂ynk/∂xj|2] of
the training data was lower for the double epoch version, but the same quantity
for the testing data was higher. This also made sense with respect to improved
accuracy: as the loss from Eq. (4.9) approached zero, more training bandwidth
would be freed up for the classification loss.
Interestingly, when considering an adaptive ψ value, we found that this param-
eter produced a more pronounced effect: see Section 4.3.1.16.
4.3.1.10 Weight regularization from Section 4.2.3
In Section 4.2.3 we proposed that Eq. (4.9) might be a replacement for the L2-loss
traditionally imposed on weights as part of the NN training process. This ex-
periment demonstrated worse performance without traditional L2 regularization,
indicating that architectures deeper than a single layer benefit from both regu-
larization terms. However, in Section 4.3.2.1, we elaborate on the need for less
L2-regularization when using our technique with large networks.
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Figure 4.13: Input (left) and adversarial examples of different CIFAR-10 classes, generated for
NNs with different levels of adversarial resistance using the different g(·) functions from Sec-
tion 4.2.1, as indicated by the heading at the top of each column. The relative accuracy and
attack RMSEs may be compared in Fig. 4.12; from top to bottom, these correspond to the exper-
iments denoted by • N1, • N2, • N3, and • N4 dots. gexplain− was generated by emphasizing
the “cat” category.
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Table 4.1: Effect of Modifications on CIFAR-10
Description Acc. Attack ARA BTR ARA
• Traditional ResNet-44 92.2 0.0013 0.0014
Varying ψ from Eq. (4.9)
ψ = 0.55,K = 1 92.5 0.0022 0.0026
ψ = 4.0 92.4 0.0039 0.0048
ψ = 30. 90.2 0.0059 0.0080
ψ = 220 84.5 0.0083 0.0135
Varying K from Eq. (4.9)
L2,adv, ψ = 220,K = 1 84.5 0.0083 0.0135
K = 2 85.0 0.0084 0.0134
K = 4 85.0 0.0084 0.0135
K = 8 84.8 0.0082 0.0133
Regularization methods
No additional regularization, ψ = 30 90.2 0.0059 0.0080
Stochastic depth [23], pL = 0.8 89.6 0.0059 0.0073
Stochastic depth, pL = 0.5 86.8 0.0051 0.0060
ShakeDrop [74], α = 0, pL = 0.8 83.4 0.0043 0.0063
Varied network depth/width
ψ = 12, 000 56.5 0.0110 0.0347
ResNet-170 55.2 0.0104 0.0332
ResNet-44, double width 59.3 0.0118 0.0343
“Dead zone” from Section 4.2.2
ψ = 12, 000, σ = 0 56.5 0.0110 0.0347
σ = 0.01 66.8 0.0112 0.0288
σ = 0.05 79.4 0.0107 0.0197
σ = 0, ψ = 220 for similar accuracy 77.1 0.0102 0.0194
Half-Huber ReLU from Section 4.2.4
ψ = 12, 000, normal ReLU 56.5 0.0110 0.0347
ψ = 12, 000, HHReLU 78.0 0.0125 0.0261
No HHReLU, but ψ = 220 for similar accuracy 77.1 0.0102 0.0194
Varied ζ from Section 4.2.2
ψ = 12, 000, HHReLU, ζ = 0 78.0 0.0125 0.0261
ζ = 0.2 73.4 0.0128 0.0297
ζ = 0.5 74.1 0.0118 0.0254
ζ = 0.8 74.7 0.0107 0.0216
ζ = 0.99 72.3 0.0083 0.0191
Output zeroing from Section 4.2.5
Dead zone σ = 1e− 2, ζ = 0, kout = 0, HHReLU,
layer drop 0.8
78.5 0.0123 0.0236
Same, kout = 0.01 78.9 0.0121 0.0222
Double epochs (400 total) 80.8 0.0118 0.0214
Effects of different modifications from Section 4.2 on the overall classification accuracy and adver-
sarial resistance of an NN classifying CIFAR-10 images. “Acc.” is the accuracy on CIFAR-10’s
test data after the final epoch. “Attack ARA” and “BTR ARA” are both as described in Sec-
tion 4.2.1.
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Table 4.2: Effect of Modifications on CIFAR-10, Part II
Description Acc. Attack ARA BTR ARA
Weight regularization from Section 4.2.3
Normal L2 weight regularization, HHReLU, ζ = 0.2,
dead zone σ = 0.01
78.9 0.0131 0.0248
Bias-only 77.7 0.0126 0.0239
See Table 4.1 for more information.
94
Table 4.3: Effect of Adaptiveness on CIFAR-10
Description Acc. Attack ARA BTR ARA
• Traditional ResNet-44 92.2 0.0013 0.0014
Others have HHReLU, normal weight regularization, no dead zone, K = 1, ζ = 0,
kout = 0.01, and use Ladv,z=2 unless otherwise specified.
Adaptive ψ from Section 4.2.6
Fixed ψ = 12, 000, final training classification loss
1.007
78.0 0.0125 0.0261
Ltarget = 1.007, initial ψ = 0.01, final ψ = 14, 000 81.0 0.0124 0.0263
Fixed ψ = 14, 000 77.8 0.0131 0.0277
Varied network depth/width
Fixed ψ = 14, 000
ResNet-44 77.8 0.0131 0.0277
ResNet-170 79.9 0.0132 0.0267
ResNet-44, double width 81.9 0.0129 0.0257
Adaptive ψ, Ltarget = 1.007
ResNet-44 81.0 0.0124 0.0263
ResNet-44, kψ,0 = 220, εworse = 0.01 80.1 0.0127 0.0274
ResNet-170 82.1 0.0128 0.0277
ResNet-44, double width 82.5 0.0129 0.0286
Different Ladv from Section 4.2.2 with Ltarget = 1.007
Ladv,z=1 = Ladv,z=0,q=1 81.2 0.0069 0.0104
Ladv,z=2 81.0 0.0124 0.0263
Ladv,z=3 78.4 0.0139 0.0317
Ladv,z=4 77.9 0.0143 0.0326
Ladv,z=5 76.6 0.0144 0.0325
Ladv,z=0,q=2 81.1 0.0082 0.0176
Ladv,z=1,q=1 80.8 0.0080 0.0172
Ladv,z=2,q=1 79.9 0.0132 0.0295
Ladv,z=2,q=2 79.7 0.0132 0.0303
Ladv,tandem from Section 4.2.2 with Ltarget = 1.007
ResNet-44, ζ = 0 81.0 0.0124 0.0263
ResNet-44, ζ = 0.2 78.7 0.0127 0.0277
ResNet-44, ζ = 0.2, Ladv,tandem 80.2 0.0131 0.0302
ResNet-44, ζ = 0.2, Ladv,tandem with sum 80.7 0.0121 0.0247• ResNet-44, ζ = 0.2, Ladv,tandem, Ltarget = 1.5 68.7 0.0151 0.0423
Effects of adaptive ψ from Section 4.2.6 on network accuracy and adversarial resistance. Columns
are the same as Table 4.1.
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Table 4.4: Effect of Adaptiveness on CIFAR-10, Part II
Description Acc. Attack ARA BTR ARA
Adversarial / noisy training from Section 4.2.7
Madry et al. method, using L2 adversarial training• L2, ε = 0.01 87.4 0.0107 0.0153
L2, ε = 0.1 88.6 0.0077 0.0205
Madry et al. method, but with L2,min training
L2,min, ε = 0.01 88.1 0.0092 0.0111
L2,min, ε = 0.1 73.8 0.0121 0.0199
HHAT, L2,min, ε = 0.1 84.4 0.0126 0.0179
HHAT, L2,min, ε = 0.1, no HHReLU 84.3 0.0122 0.0180
L2,min, ε = 0.25 74.6 0.0151 0.0256
HHAT, L2,min, ε = 0.25 83.1 0.0132 0.0204
Equation (4.9) with adv. training, using Ltarget = 1.5 and Ladv,tandem
L2,min, ε = 0.1 69.7 0.0195 0.0390• HHAT, L2,min, ε = 0.1 68.4 0.0197 0.0450
HHAT, L2, ε = 0.1 66.6 0.0164 0.0444
HHAT, L2,min, ε = 0.01 67.5 0.0163 0.0443
HHAT, L2,min, ε = 0.1, Ltarget = 1.007 79.0 0.0163 0.0306
Gaussian noise, using Ltarget = 1.0 and Ladv,tandem
Gaussian +- 0.05 78.9 0.0135 0.0309
Gaussian +- 0.25 72.8 0.0129 0.0301
Combined adversarial training with output zeroing from Section 4.2.5
• HHAT with output zeroing 68.4 0.0197 0.0450
HHAT without output zeroing 65.8 0.0197 0.0465
HITL from Section 4.2.8
ResNet-44, double width, Ltarget = 1.007 82.5 0.0129 0.0286
HITL version, 448/730 annotations 82.7 0.0128 0.0285
HITL version, 1,331/2,731 annotations 82.6 0.0133 0.0296
See Table 4.3 for more information.
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4.3.1.11 Adaptive ψ from Section 4.2.6
All previous experiments were executed with fixed values of ψ. Unfortunately, ψ
is a somewhat obtuse parameter, as shown by most of the experiments thus far:
it trades between accuracy and ARA in a consistent, but difficult to control man-
ner. Furthermore, as shown by the double-epochs experiment from Section 4.3.1.9,
fixing its value might be responsible for a type of overfitting.
This group of experiments tested whether targeting a specific training loss
– a known quantity with a more consistent meaning than a specific ψ value –
resulted in any beneficial behavior. We first took an experiment with known good
parameters at a fixed ψ, and noted its classification loss on training data for the
final epoch: L = 1.007. Setting Ltarget from Eq. (4.15) to this value, the proposed
regularization with adaptive ψ resulted in a sizeable accuracy bump, from 78 % to
81 %, while retaining the same adversarial resistance. Using the same final ψ with
a fixed network resulted in similar adversarial resistance, but lower accuracy.
4.3.1.12 Varied network depth/width
Revisiting the varied network sizes of Section 4.3.1.5, but using HHReLU, we
compared fixed and adaptive ψ formulations. Unlike Section 4.3.1.5, the fixed
ψ versions of these larger networks did demonstrate significant improvements to
accuracy compared to the baseline ResNet-44, potentially due to HHReLU having
increased the quality of the gradients when also contending with the adversarial
loss of Eq. (4.9). However, adversarial resistance declined.
For the original ResNet-44 architecture, an adaptive setting of ψ was moder-
ately better for accuracy and worse for ARA metrics. Recall that this group of
experiments used kψ,0 = 0.01, εworse = 1 from Section 4.2.6, indicating a very small
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ψ initially. We suspected that the change in performance may have been due to
the “shock” of suddenly adding a new regularization term, and that starting with
a larger kψ,0 might alleviate the problem. To test this, we added an additional
experiment with kψ,0 = 220 and εworse = 0.01 from Section 4.2.6. This experiment
retained much of the accuracy benefit of using an adaptive ψ, while recovering
much of the lost adversarial robustness.
For deeper or wider networks, the adaptive ψ versions demonstrated improve-
ments in both accuracy and adversarial ARA over the similar kψ,0 = 0.01 experi-
ment with a basic ResNet-44. We theorize that over-penalizing gradients early in
network training stymies growth, whereas gradually adding the gradient penalty
allows the network to first establish knowledge and subsequently refine it, allowing
better usage of additional parameters. Under this adaptive scheme, the double
width network outperformed the quadruple depth network by a narrow margin.
4.3.1.13 Different Ladv from Section 4.2.2 with Ltarget = 1.007
All previously mentioned experiments were conducted using Ladv,z=2 from Eq. (4.9).
Though the original theory in Section 4.2.2 indicated z = 1 would be logical based
on the behavior of derivatives in a linear network, actual networks are non-linear.
In prior regularization work, as noted in Section 4.2.3, the L2 method of weight
regularization has also been more effective.
This segment of experiments reinforced that z = 1 performed unambiguously
worse than z = 2. Interestingly, larger values of z led to increasing amounts of
adversarial resistance, at a cost of accuracy. Note that due to Ltarget, all of the
different z experiments had similar final training losses, and their testing losses
were also all about the same, with a mean and standard deviation of 1.03± 0.02.
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Therefore, the decline in accuracy probably came from increased bias due to the
interrelation of the proposed regularization method and the bias/variance trade-off.
We note that large values of z with an adaptive ψ approaches a true Lipschitz
constraint at its limit, with a variable constraint on the derivative given by the
interaction of ψ and z.
We also note that the improved attack ARA performance of z > 2 appears to
have been unique to CIFAR-10; see Section 4.3.2. However, BTR ARA increases
were consistent on the ILSVRC task as well (Section 4.3.2).
Experiments with q from Section 4.2.2 were also conducted, and showed similar
trade-offs, replacing accuracy with increased ARA. We leave further exploration
of this hyperparameter space to future work.
4.3.1.14 Ladv,tandem from Section 4.2.2
The first two experiments in this section reprised the results from Section 4.3.1.8,
though with an adaptive ψ. The third experiment demonstrated that much of the
accuracy loss from ζ > 0 could be recovered by smoothing the difference between
the true label and the next-most-confident label (as opposed to smoothing the true
label alone). Furthermore, this technique resulted in higher attack and BTR ARA
metrics.
The fourth experiment demonstrates what happened when Ladv,tandem was changed
to use addition instead of subtraction. Accuracy improved further, but attack and
BTR ARAs dropped significantly. We have no explanation for that particular
phenomenon at this time.
The fifth experiment, with Ltarget = 1.5, was ran for parity with experiments
in Paragraph 4.3.1.15.3. While accuracy slinked down from 80.2 % to 68.7 %, both
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ARAs increased. The BTR ARA increased most significantly, from 0.0302 to
0.0423. We note that this is the highest BTR ARA of any of the experiments
mentioned thus far, demonstrating that the proposed regularization continues to
scale and provide benefits even into substantially decreased levels of accuracy.
4.3.1.15 Adversarial / noisy training from Section 4.2.7
This group of results is divided into four sub-groups: reproducing Madry et al.’s
results, using Madry et al.’s technique with the L2,min adversary, combining our
regularization with adversarial training, and combining our regularization with
Gaussian noise.
4.3.1.15.1 Madry et al. method, using L2 adversarial trainingThese ex-
periments used adversarial training as a standalone technique to provide resis-
tance to adversarial examples. They were modeled off of the prior work of Madry
et al. [41] and from personal communication with A. Madry. The • dot indicates
the N2 experiment labeled in Figs. 4.12 and 4.13, and was a reproduction of the
best results from personal communication with A. Madry, albeit with a ResNet-44
instead of a ResNet-50. This experiment was therefore used for our comparison
with the state-of-the-art.
We note that increasing ε from the recommended value of 0.01 for CIFAR-10
had little beneficial effect: accuracy surprisingly increased, but only from 87.4 % to
88.6 %, and attack ARA decreased from 0.0107 to 0.0077. Interestingly, BTR ARA
did increase, from 0.0153 to 0.0205. We hypothesize this was due to BTR ARA
measuring the classifier’s ability to recognize features of object classes, without pe-
nalizing for related classes. Since the adversarial perturbations were substantially
larger, more trucks could be made to look like automobiles, for instance, and the
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Figure 4.14: The L2,min method of adversarial generation adds stability to adversarial training,
but can suffer from degeneracy, where multiple training examples of the same class override
a lone neighbor of a different class. Here, L2,min adversarial training would result in “Class
A” being overshadowed by the two “Class B” instances. Since L2,min stops at the border of a
misclassification, the class with fewer local members only successfully trains a very narrow region.
As per Paragraph 4.3.1.15.2, this may be fixed with HHAT.
differences between these classes broke down even though the classifier improved at
distinguishing them from the other classes such as bird, dog, etc. This phenomenon
was discussed previously in Section 4.2.2.
4.3.1.15.2 Madry et al. method, but with L2,min trainingWe next tested
our proposed L2,min method of adversarial training, described in Section 4.2.7. The
baseline measurements at ε = 0.01 were comparable though slightly worse than
those for L2 adversarial training. The measurements at a higher ε = 0.1 showed
drastically decreased accuracy, but significantly higher attack ARA and compara-
ble BTR ARA to the L2 training with the same ε. The decreased accuracy was
likely due to L2,min causing a sort of degeneracy, explained in Fig. 4.14. Regard-
less, when combined with Half-Half adversarial training, denoted as “HHAT” in
the results, L2,min training recovered much of its lost accuracy while retaining the
attack ARA and BTR ARA benefits.
In keeping with the other experiments of Table 4.3, many of the adversarial
training experiments were conducted with HHReLU rather than ReLU. This was
unlikely to affect the results, as HHReLU is very close to ReLU for approaches
that minimize only loss and not its derivatives. One additional experiment was
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run to ensure that this did not make a difference. As predicted, accuracy and
ARA statistics are virtually identical for adversarial training with and without
HHReLU.
To further test the progression of L2,min into larger values of ε, we conducted
two further experiments with ε = 0.25. These showed a surprising increase in
accuracy for the non-HHAT version, and predictably increased ARA ratings. The
HHAT version followed the expected course of decreased accuracy and increased
robustness.
One aspect we wish to point out is that the best-case attack ARA from these
experiments, which used only adversarial training, is on-par or slightly better than
the best-case attack ARA using only our proposed regularization, when compared
at the same level of accuracy on clean data. However, the BTR ARA was lower for
any of the adversarial training experiments when compared to the BTR ARAs for
our regularization. We therefore posit that adversarial training helps to stabilize
the direction of steepest ascent for the loss function, while our proposed regulariza-
tion stabilizes the entire loss surface. The definitions of the two techniques provide
this distinction, and the empirical evidence appears to support it.
4.3.1.15.3 Equation (4.9) with adv. training, using Ltarget = 1.5 and
Ladv,tandemCombining what was learned from the previous sections, experiments
were conducted with a combination of adversarial training and our proposed reg-
ularization. These yielded the best results, improving over the previous bests in
both attack ARA and BTR ARA for given levels of accuracy. The HHAT variety
of adversarial training best preserved the benefits to BTR ARA, so that is what we
recommend moving forward. We also note the importance of both L2,min adver-
sarial training and an appropriately high value of ε for attack ARA. While smaller
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values of ε still yielded excellent BTR ARA, this was also seen in Section 4.3.1.14,
and as such likely came almost entirely from our method.
4.3.1.15.4 Gaussian noise, using Ltarget = 1.0 and Ladv,tandemThe combina-
tion of our method with adversarial training was motivated by an attempt to find
“loss cliffs” (Section 4.2.7). To ensure that the computational overhead of adver-
sarial training added value to this cause beyond that of random noise, we also ran
several experiments with Gaussian noise added on a per-component basis. In these
experiments, each color value of each pixel received a perturbation independent of
all other colors on all other pixels. Again, the BTR ARA was mostly preserved,
but the attack ARA was substantially lower than when combined with adversarial
training.
4.3.1.16 Combined adversarial training with output zeroing from Sec-
tion 4.2.5
These two experiments demonstrated that the output zeroing method can have
a more significant impact on accuracy without affecting attack ARA when using
an adaptive ψ, but that the overall benefit was likely not worthwhile, particu-
larly when considering the additional metaparameter. Nonetheless, most of the
experiments in this paper were conducted with output zeroing as in Section 4.2.5.
4.3.1.17 HITL from Section 4.2.8
Two annotators annotated overly-saturated adversarial images generated from a
double-width ResNet-44 via the UI in Fig. 4.11. These adversarial images were
produced from the CIFAR-10 training data. One annotator annotated 730 and the
other annotated 2,107 images. Of these annotations, 106 were of the same images,
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and 72 of those were annotated with the same decision (changed, unchanged, or
unsure), indicating that annotators agreed on 68 % of the images. The double-
width ResNet-44 architecture was then re-trained from scratch using a dataset
consisting of the adversarial images annotated “unchanged” concatenated to the
original CIFAR-10 dataset. The first experiment only used annotations from the
first annotator, and had a total of 448 adversarial images with an “unchanged”
target class added to the training dataset; the second experiment had a total of
1,331 images added. Example adversarial examples annotated as “changed” and
“unchanged” may be found in Appendix A.1.
In the first experiment, adding a small number of annotations made virtually no
difference. Note that CIFAR-10 has 50,000 training images, so we only increased
the dataset’s size by 0.9 %. In the second experiment, which added 2.7 %, we saw
an approximately 3 % gain in both attack ARA and BTR ARA, with little change
in accuracy. These gains could potentially be improved by stacking adversarial
training with the technique. Given that the examples added to the dataset came
from the dataset itself, a linear improvement in attack defense is very promising.
A smaller dataset might find more benefit from adding training examples in this
manner. A comparison of the adversarial examples from these networks may be
found in Appendix A.1.
4.3.2 ImageNet Experiments
Our results on CIFAR-10 were encouraging, but not a guarantee that the technique
would extend to larger networks with more complicated tasks. We trained several
networks on ILSVRC 2012, but were somewhat limited in experiments due to each
taking roughly a week to train on our hardware without adversarial training, and
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Table 4.5: Effect of Modifications on ImageNet and COCO
Description Acc. Attack ARA BTR ARA
Standard ResNet-18 65.6 0.0004 0.0013
Weight regularization from Section 4.2.3
ψ = 0.7e6, dead zone 0.002, kout = 5e− 5† 20.6 0.0013 0.0125
Use 1e-6 instead of 1e-4 L2 regularization 50.4 0.0039 0.0184
Automatic ψ from Section 4.2.6
ψ = 4.8e6 42.9 0.0041 0.0185
Ltarget = 3.1 45.5 0.0041 0.0182
Ltarget = 3.1 with HHAT, ε = 0.1 42.2 0.0053 0.0282
Ltarget = 4.0, no HHAT 35.5 0.0041 0.0243
Ltarget = 5.0 23.7 0.0038 0.0388
Ltarget = 5.0, Ladv,z=2,q=1 22.0 0.0037 0.0538
Ltarget = 5.0, Ladv,z=5 19.7 0.0035 0.0526
COCO
ResNet-44 from Section 4.2.9.3, baseline 77.3 0.0003 0.0008
With Eq. (4.9) 45.2 0.0029 0.0278
AT only, L2,min, ε = 0.1 60.8 0.0025 0.0089
Combined Eq. (4.9) + AT 45.2 0.0026 0.0228
Combined Eq. (4.9) + HHAT 45.2 0.0029 0.0250
Balanced classes, Eq. (4.9) only 25.8 0.0055 0.0335
Balanced classes, Eq. (4.9) + HHAT 26.9 0.0054 0.0325
Effects of different modifications from Section 4.2 on the overall classification accuracy and ad-
versarial resistance of an NN classifying ImageNet and COCO images.
† This experiment was aborted after 18 epochs as it went unstable; the experiment below it had
an accuracy of 43.0 % at the same number of epochs.
several weeks with adversarial training. Nonetheless, we validated our ResNet-18
implementation with a top-1 accuracy of 65.6 %, consistent with literature given
we used 65 epochs rather than the usual 90. Results for the following sections are
found in Table 4.5.
4.3.2.1 Weight regularization from Section 4.2.3
While using the proposed regularization to replace L2 weight regularization as per
Section 4.2.3 did not pan out for CIFAR-10, in ImageNet we found that it was
vital to reduce the amount of L2 weight regularization from 1e − 4 to 1e − 6 for
the network to converge with our regularization. This was not required for the
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standard ResNet-18. Relative to the task, ResNet-18 is likely underparameterized,
and the classification loss, L2 loss, and proposed Ladv loss were likely too at odds to
find a good solution. Reducing the amount of L2 loss made the problem tractable
again.
4.3.2.2 Automatic ψ from Section 4.2.6
Given its efficacy on CIFAR-10, and that it was a better parameterization of the
problem, we conducted all but one of the ILSVRC 2012 experiments with an adap-
tive ψ. All of these were conducted with HHReLU, an L2 weight regularization
of 1e-6, no dead zone, σ = 0, kout = 5e − 5, and Ladv,z=2 unless otherwise speci-
fied. The first two experiments in this group showed that, again, an adaptive ψ
outperformed a fixed value of ψ. The subsequent experiments demonstrated the
existence of the accuracy/attack RMSE trade-off, just like with CIFAR-10. How-
ever, with 1,000 classes, ImageNet’s attack ARA did not scale well as accuracy
fell. The BTR ARA scaled well. See Appendix A.1 for examples of adversarial
examples generated on these networks.
The proposed regularization method worked well on ILSVRC 2012, and was ca-
pable of generating convincing adversarial examples for many of the target classes.
Other target classes, such as “n01484850 great white shark,” were clearly un-
derspecified in the dataset, probably due to a lack of other classes with similar
features. Many shark images are predominantly water, a property shared by few
other ILSVRC 2012 classes. Similarly, the adversarial explanations resulted in the
addition of water to the input more than any other feature.
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4.3.3 COCO Experiments
Experiments were conducted on COCO to determine the efficacy of our regulariza-
tion. As described in Section 4.2.9.3, the COCO dataset was a somewhat unique
experiment as many of the images overlapped with other classes and the “person”
class was over-represented as 31.4 % of the total dataset.
Without any methods providing adversarial resistance, our COCO network
scored 77.3 % accuracy with an attack ARA rating of 0.0003. Note that the high
accuracy of a naive classifier – 31.4 % – swallows up much of the area that would
otherwise increase the ARA ratings on this problem. Adversarial training added a
good amount of attack ARA but only a little BTR ARA, consistent with previous
experiments from Paragraph 4.3.1.15.2. However, using only our technique without
any adversarial training resulted in the best overall statistics. We initially supposed
this was due to the class imbalance, as L2,min adversarial training can suppress the
correct label (Fig. 4.14). Unfortunately, experiments with balanced training on the
COCO dataset, such that the classification loss for each label was divided by the
percentage of that label, still resulted in little benefit from adversarial training. It
is thus very possible that adversarial training did not make the COCO networks
more robust as a consequence of the high number of overlapping objects in different
frames — the actual distances between classes in the base problem were sufficiently
small that adversarial training offered little benefit.
4.4 Combination with Network Bisection SRMs
Since I had previously dealt with network bisection SRMs, which are similar to
attention networks, I was curious how these would combine with the adversarial
robustness methods laid out this this chapter.
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<input> plane car bird cat deer dog frog horse ship truck
Figure 4.15: A side-by-side comparison of the gexplain,+ explanations from a network with the
adversarial robustness modifications (top) versus with both adversarial robustness modification
and the GIM SRM (bottom) shows that filtering out some of the intermediate activity of the
network resulted in little change to the explanations.
For the first set of experiments, I measured the attack and BTR ARAs of the
network bisection SRMs which utilized GIMs. The attack ARAs were identical to
a traditional network (0.0013 across the board), and the BTR ARA was slightly
elevated, up to 0.0018 from 0.0014.
For a second set of experiments, I trained a network with both the GIMs and
the adversarial robustness techniques (but no adversarial training). Compared
to similar networks without the GIMs, this resulted in worse accuracy (down to
65.1 % from 68.7 %), lower attack ARA (to 0.0148 from 0.0151), and marginally
increased BTR ARA (to 0.0438 from 0.0423). Comparison explanations are shown
in Fig. 4.15.
This chapter also illuminated the reason that network bisection SRMs did not
improve a network’s adversarial resistance. Section 4.2.2 involves measuring the
partial of the network’s output with respect to each input. Taking the square
root of the expected value of these partials squared, a number may be generated
which demonstrates how susceptible that network is to adversarial perturbations.
Since the network bisection SRM resulted in fewer spatial points reaching the
output, this number increased by a similar amount. That is, to make up for the
removed pixels, decisions based on the remaining pixels were more volatile. Since
the classification output then had a greater derivative with respect to these pixels,
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attacks could then consist of smaller perturbations to the input regions passed to
the classifier.
4.5 Oregon Health & Science University MEP-LINCS Report
Using the previously described techniques, I generated a report on cell features
arising from environmental factors as part of an ongoing collaboration with OHSU
on their Microenvironment Perturbagen (MEP) contribution to the National In-
stitutes of Health (NIH)’s Library of Integrated Network-based Cellular Signatures
(LINCS). In the MEP-LINCS project, cell cultures in-vitro were treated with a
variety of ligands, resulting in different cellular growth patterns. The section of
the project that we dealt with had 177,492 images, each treated with one of 57
different ligands. The amount of data is substantial, and as such, OHSU was
interested in techniques which might help elucidate this data.
Figure 4.16 is a reproduced excerpt from the resulting 63-page report, showing
the visual features which would be expected from other cell cultures had they been
treated with the cxcl12|beta ligand rather than the ligands with which they were
actually treated.
4.6 Discussion
We demonstrated a regularization technique based on the Lipschitz constraint,
which significantly enhanced the ability of networks to resist adversarial examples.
On ILSVRC 2012, the methods in this work increased the ARA by 2.4× over the
previous state-of-the-art, while retaining the same level of accuracy on clean data
and using a network one-third of the size of the previous state-of-the-art. More cen-
tral to the tenets of this work, we demonstrated that the stability added by this
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Figure 4.16: Excerpt from the MEP-LINCS report delivered to OHSU. In the gray box are
example images, unaltered, which were from the group treated with cxcl12|beta. Below that are
three rows of images, each column being different views of the same image. Row 1 contains the
adversarial example for cxcl12|beta using gexplain,+. Row 2 contains the unaltered base image,
and the ligand with which it was originally treated. Row 3 shows the difference between rows 1
and 2.
technique allows for adversarial examples to be generated with very discernible
features. These adversarial examples could then be used as non-linear explana-
tion mechanisms, working with the network to produce more reliable explanations
than prior work. Furthermore, we demonstrated that these new adversarial exam-
ples might be annotated and fed back into the training process to yield improved
adversarial resistance with a feasible number of additional annotations.
No reliable, quantitative metrics for interpretability exist at present, though
some attempts have been made [25]. Most current research into explainable AI
using NNs has focused on achieving high-quality anecdotal results, without signif-
icant importance placed on the fidelity of the explanations [20]. The introduction
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of BTR ARA as a metric which correlates well with the qualitative capacity of
explanations may add a more reliable, quantitative measure to the field.
One of the desired aspects from Chapter 3 was not covered by this approach:
the exposing of an intermediate step in the calculation. However, the stabilization
techniques presented in this chapter could also be used to provide stability to
the internal nodes of the network, and generating adversarial examples based on
those internal nodes would then create the intermediate representations which were
discussed in Chapter 3.
For future work, it would also be very interesting to apply the derived explana-
tion techniques to control mechanisms for self-driving cars. Every major company
has a branch working on this technology [8,38], and ignoring the intrinsic require-
ments and the difficulties of those requirements would be an oversight. Specifically,
self-driving cars require that the control network be more predictable, robust, and
explainable than other applications. Self-driving cars must be predictable, or else
they will stir distrust of the vehicles and induce negative legislation. If their net-
works are not robust, especially in the context of adversarial examples, then the
cars would be easy to fool and make crash, an error potentially resulting in loss-
of-life. Finally, for insurance purposes, self-driving vehicles need to have a level of
explainability that is not present in other ML applications. Adversarial explana-
tions partially address each of these requirements through increased reliability and
focus on interpretability.
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5
Conclusion
The goal of this dissertation was to provide intuitive, reliable explanations for the
decisions made by NNs, with a quality exceeding that of the current state-of-the-
art. The proposed mechanism for accomplishing this was utilization of the sensory
domain, highlighting features which were deemed relevant in a domain intuitive
for human operators. Thus, the title, “Sensory Relevance Models.”
This work was initially inspired by Rozell et al.’s LCA [55], as shown in Chap-
ter 2. The experience of working with the LCA led to the realization that a good
explanation requires some sparsity. However, when combined with deep learn-
ing, the LCA resulted in worse performance than inputting the raw pixels directly
(Appendix A.2, Fig. 15). It was theorized that this was due to the unsupervised
means of learning the LCA’s mapping, and a supervised extension was developed
in Section 2.3. While the supervised approach of learning the LCA’s dictionary
improved accuracy when combining an LCA with a classification problem, the
benefits were not substantial enough to motivate further usage of the LCA in the
context of sparsity for explanations. Therefore, it was important to find a method
for achieving sparsity without using the LCA (Section 2.4).
Neural networks can be thought of as universal approximators, and there is no
reason they also could not provide sparsity in a form similar to that seen by the
LCA. This conclusion led to the proposition and development of network bisection
SRMs (Chapter 3). By adding auxiliary losses to an intermediate layer, such
as adjusting the activity of that layer (Section 3.3.1) or by keeping track of the
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layer’s gradient information in a secondary NN (Section 3.3.2), the activity of that
layer may be visualized in a sparse manner. These networks differed from prior
work on annotating salient regions, attention models: they completely removed
large portions of the input from consideration in the final classification decision,
were trained via an auxiliary loss rather than the primary classification loss, and
consisted of an entire feature dimension rather than just a mask. In the most
sparse network produced, only 26 % of the input was used in a classifier which
yielded 75 % classification accuracy (Section 3.4). The sparse activity from the
network bisection SRM aligned well with salient features from the input images,
shown in Fig. 3.4. However, when network bisection SRMs were tested in relation
to adversarial examples, it was found that they were not more resistant than a
traditional network, despite filtering out large portions of the input. Network
bisection SRMs also disappointed in terms of yielding similar information to prior,
heatmap-based methods of explanation, and in terms of producing uninformative
hierarchies.
In light of these limitations, two flaws were identified that would need to be
addressed before a more reliable explanation for NN decisions could be produced
(Section 3.4). First, existing methods were all susceptible to adversarial examples,
which called the neighborhood of validity of any such explanation into question.
Second, all existing methods for explaining a decision on an image reduced to
heatmap-based approaches, which do little to inform an inspector about the qual-
ities considered important within the highlighted region. An algorithm that can
draw a circle around a cat does not necessarily show knowledge that the circle
contains a cat, but only indicates knowledge concerning the presence of a salient
object.
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Further research on addressing these flaws led to the development of adver-
sarial explanations (Chapter 4 and Appendix A.1, [72]). Rather than produc-
ing a method of explanation in spite of adversarial examples, it made sense to
work with them. I showed for the first time that adversarial examples may be
used as a reliable, high-definition method of explaining the decisions of neural
networks (Fig. 1.2). These images unambiguously support the reasoning behind
a classification decision, and are undeniably effective at reproducing macro-scale
structures leveraged by a classification NN (Fig. 4.9). One common criticism of
classification NNs is that they yield a bag-of-features approach; the explanations
within this work have contributed evidence showing a bag-of-features classifier is
not mandated by the convolutional approach, though it is one possible outcome
(see Appendix of Appendix A.1). Furthermore, I introduced network modifications
and training strategies which resulted in networks 2.4× more resistant to adver-
sarial attacks than the previous state-of-the-art (Section 4.2). The modifications
included a stochastic Lipschitz constraint, partially replacing the L2 weight regu-
larization with the stochastic Lipschitz constraint, a Half-Huber Rectified Linear
Unit activation function, an adaptive controller for controlling the trade-off be-
tween accuracy and explanation quality, and an alternative method of adversarial
training, L2,min (Section 4.2). These modifications were leveraged to show that the
resulting networks not only produce high-quality explanations, but demonstrate
generative qualities as well, enabling the transformation of a base image into im-
ages of different classes (Appendix A.1). I introduced a metric which correlated
well with the quality of the resulting explanations, the BTR ARA (Section 4.2.1.2).
These networks were also tested for HITL compatibility, and showed some promise
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at generating networks which were even more resistant to adversarial attacks (Sec-
tion 4.3.1.17).
In all, this work has demonstrated significant advancements in the field of
machine learning, particularly for explaining the decisions of NNs. I hope that this
work provides a basis for future work in the realms of both adversarial resistance
and explainable machine learning, making algorithms more reliable for industry
fields where accountability matters, such as biomedical or autonomous vehicles.
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A
Appendix Selected Papers
This appendix contains additional information on supplemental papers which demon-
strate the full scope of this dissertation, in addition to the primary narrative es-
tablished in Chapters 1 to 4. This appendix describes each paper and the reason
for its inclusion.
On PDXScholar, copies of these papers may be found under the “Additional
Files” heading. The citations given also include sufficient information to find copies
of these works.
A.1 Adversarial Explanations for Understanding Image Classification
Decisions and Improved Neural Network Robustness
This paper is under revision with Nature Machine Intelligence as of Aug. 2019 (a
pre-print is available on ArXiv [72]), and is included on PDXScholar as
“Woods2019adversarial.pdf”. It details adversarial explanations, both in terms
of the problems with existing explanation methods and my proposed solutions, as
described in Chapter 4 of this work. This paper also contains an appendix with
many more visual examples of adversarial explanations.
My contributions to this work were the original idea, the algorithms, the exper-
iment design, the majority of experiment execution, interpreting of the results, and
the majority of the document writing. J. H. Chen was responsible for the LIME
and Grad-CAM integrations, annotating images in the HITL section, and provid-
ing text on related work for the HITL experiments. C. Teuscher was responsible
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for advising on scope, editing, and providing funding.
A.2 Fast and Accurate Sparse Coding of Visual Stimuli with a Simple,
Ultra-Low-Energy Spiking Architecture
This paper was published by IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning
Systems in 2018 [69], and is included on PDXScholar as “Woods2018sslca.pdf”.
The work details a hardware implementation I designed for a sparse coding algo-
rithm based on Rozell et al.’s LCA [55], and demonstrates the efficacy of combining
unsupervised sparse coding with deep learning solutions, both in the context of an
optimal sparse coding algorithm and the hardware approximation. The lackluster
results of the deep learning solution combined with the sparse coding architecture,
coupled with the exploration of the supervised LCA (Section 2.3) provided sig-
nificant motivation to explore alternate forms of sparsity, leading to the network
bisection SRM (Chapter 3).
My contributions to this work were the idea to place the state capacitors directly
on the memristive crossbar, a key insight in providing low-power inhibition; the
supporting mathematics; the experiment design; the experiment execution; the
interpretation of results; and the writing of the document. C. Teuscher provided
the idea to use memristors for the LCA crossbar, editing, and funding.
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